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Various nations in the international domain speculate that China alone has enough 
leverage to compel North Korea into giving up its nuclear weapons. However, China claims 
that its influence over North Korea is limited. Although China remains North Korea’s most 
important ally, their relationship often has been categorized as complex and ambiguous, as 
both countries are driven by a shared history of succumbing to foreign aggression. Some 
argue that historical events led the two countries to become estranged rather than to become 
strong allies. Conversely, others contend that the history between China and North Korea 
drives both countries to maintain an enduring alliance. Therefore, this thesis answers the 
question: Does China alone possess enough leverage to have major influence on North 
Korea’s behavior? Through analysis of China and North Korea’s alliance formation, the 
first and second nuclear crises, and the Six Party Talks, this thesis contends that China 
alone does not have enough leverage to alter North Korea’s behavior because diplomatic 
ties are not as close as some may believe. Therefore, the international community should 
cooperate with China so that influence may be gained over North Korea’s behavior.   
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis seeks to answer the question: Does China alone possess enough leverage 
to have major influence on North Korea’s behavior? While China remains North Korea’s 
most important ally, their relationship has often been categorized as complex and 
ambiguous, driven by a shared history of succumbing to foreign aggression. Some argue 
that historical events have led the two countries to become estranged rather than strong 
allies. Conversely, others contend that the history between China and North Korea drives 
both countries to maintain a strong and enduring alliance. Although the alliance of North 
Korea and China may be driven by historical factors, one must consider leverage when 
attempting to evaluate this alliance. 
From an outside view, it might seem that China’s measurably greater power would 
enable it to subdue North Korea at will. However, historical evidence of North Korea’s 
defiance shows otherwise. North Korea remains unafraid to act aggressively against other 
nations; however, China seems to be the most capable country that can pressure the nation 
to alter its behavior. This research posits that leverage not only plays a critical role within 
the limitation of power between China and North Korea, but also within the increase of 
dependency between both China and North Korea. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE 
The United States has a vested interest in North Korea for both security and political 
reasons. Led by an authoritarian regime, North Korea is often labeled as a “hermit 
kingdom”1 because its society remains closed off from the rest of the world. Additionally, 
North Korea’s pursuit of developing nuclear weapon capabilities threatens and destabilizes 
the Pacific theater. Moreover, it has communicated a willingness to use these capabilities 
against its neighbors to the south (South Korea), to the east (Japan), and against the United 
States. The United States has maintained alliances with both Japan and South Korea to 
                                                 
1 Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 
2005), 87. 
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counter this threat. The region fosters a destabilizing situation because surrounding nations 
must be on constant alert for a potential conflict with North Korea. 
The Korean War came to a halt with the signing of the armistice agreement in 1953; 
however, the United States has been unsuccessful at achieving solidified diplomatic 
relations with North Korea since. Many have claimed that North Korea views the United 
States from a “once an enemy, always the enemy” perspective because of its decision to 
form an alliance with South Korea and the devastation North Korea experienced by U.S. 
bombings during the Korean War. Bruce Cumings stated, “The armistice signed on July 
27, 1953, stilled the guns, but it brought no formal peace.”2 Taking from his notion, 
historical barriers pose challenges to United States-North Korea relations and enduring 
agreements. 
For example, the United States’ attempted to dissuade North Korea from pursuing 
nuclear weapons development in the early 1990s. In 1994, the U.S. and North Korea signed 
the Agreed Framework,3 and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization 
(KEDO)4 agreement in 1995. North Korea also agreed to alter its previous stance and 
remain a Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) member. North Korea 
chose to freeze its nuclear operations in exchange for economic assistance from the United 
States.5 However, these agreements became severed as the United States discovered North 
Korea had been noncompliant to non-proliferation obligations. The United States 
responded by suspending oil deliveries to North Korea in the fall of 2002. North Korea 
used the embargo as justification for officially ceasing its commitments to the Agreement 
                                                 
2 Bruce Cumings, North Korea: Another Country (New York: New Press, 2011), 3.  
3 As Pollack notes, the Agreed Framework was “a deal in which North Korea pledged to consistently 
take steps to implement the January 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula. [This] obligated the South and North not to test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, 
deploy or use nuclear weapons, as well as committing both countries not [to] possess nuclear reprocessing 
and uranium enrichment facilities.” Jonathan Pollack. “The United States, North Korea, and the End of the 
Agreed Framework,” Naval War College Review LVI, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 13.  
4 Pollack also notes, “Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO): The United 
States agreed to establish and lead a multinational consortium that would oversee the financing and 
construction of a pair of thousand-megawatt light-water reactors to replace the North’s existing or planned 
graphite-moderated reactors.” Pollack, “The United States, North Korea,” 18.  
5 Pollack, “The United States, North Korea,” 18–19.  
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Framework on December 12, 2002.6 Then, on January 10, 2003, North Korea declared 
“automatic and immediate” effectuation of its withdrawal from the NPT and its “complete 
free[dom] from the restrictions of the safeguard agreement with the IAEA.”7 
This exemplary case supports the argument that the United States alone is incapable 
of fully influencing North Korea to change. Because China is North Korea’s strongest ally, 
the United States must not abandon its reliance on China if any hope of cooperation can be 
achieved with North Korea. The United States is currently exerting diplomatic pressure on 
China to restrain North Korea; however, it has also considered unilateral military action as 
an option to counter North Korea’s provocative behavior. This course of action could 
provoke World War III; therefore, the United States should not exercise unilateral military 
action against North Korea unless all other options have been exhausted and use of force 
is necessary. By determining if China has the leverage to influence North Korea’s behavior, 
the United States will be in a better position of shaping its foreign policy toward the Korean 
peninsula. 
China’s ability to use leverage to influence North Korea’s behavior matters to it 
because it does not want to be dragged into a war. Rising tension between the United States 
and North Korea further entraps Chine in the role of a mediator between the two countries. 
Additionally, China experiences pressure from the international community to curtail 
North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and aggressive actions because they could potentially 
lead to war. While China may value the deterrence factor that comes with North Korea’s 
aggression towards the international community, it also recognizes that North Korea’s 
continued aggression will serve only as justification for the United States in pursuing 
military actions. 
North Korea’s ability to use its defiance as leverage over China’s behavior matters 
to them because the closer the United States and China become, the greater it becomes a 
threat to the China and North Korean alliance. As North Korea perceives that the United 
States will always be an enemy, it will also continue to distrust the United States and its 
                                                 
6 Pollack, “The United States, North Korea,” 41.  
7 Pollack, “The United States, North Korea,” 41.  
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allies. As such, North Korea will continue to preserve its alliance with China to ensure the 
two of them remain tied to one another so that the United States influence on the Korean 
peninsula will remain challenged. Therefore, this thesis examines whether China alone has 
enough leverage to influence North Korea or if this contention has been severely 
overestimated. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review examines various arguments regarding alliance formation 
and relationships between great and small powers and then links those arguments to the 
dynamics of the China and North Korean alliance. First, I survey the various explanations 
as to why countries form alliances. Second, I discuss the scholarly assessments about why 
great and small powers seek alliance with one another. Finally, I review assessments of the 
China and North Korean relationship. Reviewing the literature related to alliance formation 
and literature related to the China and North Korean relationship must be conducted for 
two reasons. The first reason is because China, a great power, and North Korea, a smaller 
power, have formed an alliance, which still holds today. The second reason is to determine 
why the alliance is still surviving. For these reasons, reviewing literature covering the ways 
in which a great power would benefit from an alliance with a small power, and vice versa, 
will bring further insight regarding the interpretations of the relationship between China 
and North Korea. 
1. Why Alliances Form 
Why do nations seek alliance with one another in the first place? This section covers 
four schools of thought explaining why alliances occur. First, countries form alliances to 
balance against external threats. Second, states’ self-interests are the ultimate reason for 
alliance formation. Third, states form alliances to prevent war. Finally, various countries 
form alliances because the elites in power are determined to ensure political survival. 
a. Alliances Form to Balance against Threats  
Some scholars argue that states form alliances due to a threat rather than solely to 
seek power. In Origins of Alliances, Harvard University Professor Stephen M. Walt claims 
 5 
that balance of threat theory is a stronger explanation of alliance formation than just 
seeking to gain power. He argues that states form alliances because they perceive a stronger 
state as threatening their sovereignty and says that states form alliances with one another 
to balance against a perceived threat, or states will choose to form an alliance with the 
threat, which he refers to as “bandwagoning.”8 Walt has determined that states are more 
likely to balance against a threat rather than bandwagon and that balancing is safer because 
there is less motive for the states in alliance to turn against one another.9 The weaker state 
may view bandwagoning with the more powerful state as an opportunity rather than a 
potential threat; however, it also has to worry whether its stronger ally will turn against 
it.10 
Walt later published “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse” in which he describes 
various factors that play a role in explaining why alliances are likely to succeed or fail. He 
suggests that alliances likely endure if there is an asymmetric level of interests within the 
alliance, if the allies share similar political values, and if there are effective institutions 
within the alliance.11 On the other hand, he contends that alliances are likely to fail if the 
perception of a threat diminishes or changes, if interests between the allies is redefined, if 
one ally discredits the other’s capability to contribute to the alliance, or if one ally no longer 
requires the capabilities of its ally.12 Walt concluded that alliances are maintained because 
of the commitment shared by each ally to continue their alliance.13 
In Balance of Power, T.V. Paul challenges Walt’s claim, arguing that states have 
more options than balancing or bandwagoning. Paul contends that the balance of power 
theory must also take into consideration that hard-balancing, soft-balancing, and 
asymmetric-balancing are actions by which states can take when in an alliance so that they 
                                                 
8 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (New York: Cornell University Press, 1987), 5, 17.  
9 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 5, 29.  
10 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 29.  
11 Stephen M. Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” Survival 39, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 156–179, 
doi: 10.1080/00396339708442901, 170.  
12 Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” 164.  
13 Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” 170.  
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can fully capture the behavior of other states.14 In hard-balancing, states increase their own 
capabilities and form alliances and counter-alliances to match the capabilities of their 
opponents.15 In soft-balancing, states develop limited security understandings between one 
another to balance against a potential threatening state.16 In asymmetric-balancing, states 
sponsor subnational actors to challenge and weaken established states by asymmetric 
means.17 
In Dangerous Alliances, political scientist Patricia A. Weitsman assesses the 
implications of alliance formation and cohesion to gain a better understanding of the 
internal and external dimensions of alliances.18 In her analysis of Walt’s theory on alliance 
behavior, she has determined that it is not enough to assess alliance behaviors solely by a 
state facing the threat of an aggressor. Rather, she suggests there is a “curvilinear 
relationship” between a threat and alliance formation, and she assesses that the threat levels 
of states bring a greater understanding of the various alliance behaviors, which occur at 
different threat levels.19 She dismissed other scholars’ claims that alliances are managed 
by coexisting with capability aggregation.20 Finally, she concludes that to understand 
alliance formation and cohesion, one must examine internal and external levels of threat to 
the alliance.21 
Victor Cha also contends against scholars who claim that states only have the option 
of balancing or bandwagoning against a threat. In Alignment despite Antagonism, he 
developed the quasi alliance theory model to add to the existing theories of alliance 
behavior. His theory derives from Glenn Snyder’s concepts of “abandonment” and 
                                                 
14 T. V. Paul, “Introduction: The Enduring Axioms of Balance of Power Theory and Their 
Contemporary Relevance,” in Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, ed. T. V. Paul, 
James J. Wirtz, and Michael Fortmann (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 2–3.   
15 Paul, “Introduction,” 3.  
16 Paul, “Introduction,” 3.  
17 Paul, “Introduction,” 3.  
18 Patricia A. Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War (Palo Alto, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2004), 3.  
19 Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances, 4–5.  
20 Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances, 4.  
21 Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances, 165.  
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“entrapment.”22 Cha defines a quasi-alliance as “the relationship between two states that 
remain unallied despite sharing a common ally.”23 Additionally, Cha has made three 
propositions. First, if a state fears abandonment, it demonstrates greater commitment to the 
alliance to gain the same response from the ally.24 Second, if a state fears entrapment, it 
demonstrates lower commitment to the alliance to deter its ally from pursuing the 
adversary.25 Third, the most effective strategy is to maximize one’s security through the 
alliance while minimalizing obligations where possible.26 Furthermore, Cha supports the 
claim that while an external threat can facilitate alliance formation, the perception of an 
ally’s is important.27 
In “The Decision to Ally,” political scientist Michael Altfeld argues that alliance 
formations are based on trade-offs to ensure security. According to Altfeld, a government’s 
functionality is dependent upon maximizing the uses of autonomy, civilian wealth, and 
national security.28 Governments use wealth generated by civil society to invest in 
armament proliferation, risk their autonomy by forming military alliances, or they do 
both.29 Armament proliferation and alliance formation become the trade-offs against which 
a government weighs when seeking increased security.30 Altfeld concludes that if security 
levels between potential allies cannot be increased, they will not form an alliance formation 
in most cases.31 
                                                 
22 Victor D. Cha, Alignment despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Palo Alto, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 37. See also Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2007), 180–199; Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World 
Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 461–496.   
23 Cha, Alignment despite Antagonism, 36.  
24 Cha, Alignment despite Antagonism, 44.  
25 Cha, Alignment despite Antagonism, 45.  
26 Cha, Alignment despite Antagonism, 45.  
27 Cha, Alignment despite Antagonism, 48–49.  
28 Michael F. Altfeld, “The Decision to Ally: A Theory and Test,” The Western Political Quarterly 
37, no. 4 (December 1984): 524.  
29 Altfeld, “The Decision to Ally,” 526.  
30 Altfeld, “The Decision to Ally,” 537.  
31 Altfeld, “The Decision to Ally,” 538.  
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b. Alliances Form Because of States Self-Interests 
While the first school of thought contends that alliances form due to threat 
perceptions, the second school contends that alliances form because of the interest of states. 
In “Alliances and Asymmetry,” James D. Morrow used an autonomy-security model 
framework to argue that states maintain alliances because of asymmetric levels of interests 
between both states.32 He believed that when both states can appeal to their interest, they 
are willing to make trade-offs of their autonomy or security.33 Morrow’s argument 
regarding interests overshadow Altfeld’s work on alliance/armament trade-off theory. He 
later published “Arms versus Allies” wherein he concluded that internal costs and external 
benefits factor into a states’ decision in forming alliances and increasing their military 
capabilities.34 
In the 2010 article “Prior Commitments,” political scientists Douglas Gibler and 
Toby J. Rider argue that the interests between states is the stronger explanation behind 
alliance formation and sustainment.35 They contend that scholars who use the autonomy-
security trade-off model assume that the interests of states are a product of capability 
differences in an alliance, thereby obscuring its significance.36 Gibler and Rider have 
determined that where allies share complete similar interests, the alliance terminates once 
the issue that brought the allies together is settled. Conversely, when allies have a 
compatibility of interests, their alliance endures because of the long-term interests that they 
seek from each other. 
In Why Nations Cooperate, Arthur Stein argue against the notion that states form 
alliances based on the self-interests of states.37 Stein’s position counters that of Gibler and 
                                                 
32 James D. Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model 
of Alliances,” American Journal of Political Science 35, no. 4 (November 1991): 930.  
33 Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry,” 930.  
34 James D. Morrow, “Arms versus Allies: Trade-Offs in the Search for Security,” International 
Organization 47, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 231.  
35 Douglas Gibler and Toby J. Rider, “Prior Commitments: Compatible Interests versus Capabilities in 
Alliance Behavior,” International Interactions 30, no. 4 (2004): 314, doi: 10.1080/03050620490883985.  
36 Gibler and Rider, “Prior Commitments,” 309, 311.  
37 Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations 
(New York: Cornell University Press, 1990), 152.  
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Rider as he argues self-interests are the underlying cause of why alliances fail. Stein 
concludes that when individual and joint interests overlap, it creates conflict, and the 
alliance is no longer valued.38 
Similarly, Thomas J. Christensen claims that alliance failure stems from conflict 
between the allies. In Worse than a Monolith, he argues that when there is conflict in an 
alliance, achieving goals comes at a greater cost, conflicts with the enemy are prolonged, 
and the adversary becomes more capable of gaining the advantage.39 
c. Alliances Form to Prevent War 
The third school of thought contends that nations also form alliances with other 
nations to prevent war. Alastair Smith found that alliance formations serve as a means of 
extended deterrence against a potential aggressor. According to Smith, an aggressive nation 
is more likely to attack another nation without an alliance because of the increased 
probability of its victory (considering the aggressor possesses greater military strength).40 
However, where there is an alliance, the aggressive state is less likely to attack a targeted 
nation because of the likelihood that its ally will intervene in the conflict, which may lower 
the aggressive state’s probability of victory.41 For Smith, extended deterrence via alliance 
is an effective means to prevent wars in most cases. 
In Pivotal Deterrence, Timothy Crawford makes the counterargument that 
refraining from making an alliance also serves as an alternative option in the prevention of 
war. Crawford argues that, through pivotal deterrence, a third-party state could be just as 
effective in preventing a war between two nations if the third-party state refrained from 
committing to either side of the conflict.42 
                                                 
38 Stein, Why Nations Cooperate, 163.  
39 Thomas J. Christensen, Worse Than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive 
Diplomacy in Asia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 1.  
40 Alastair Smith. “Extended Deterrence and Alliance Formation,” International Interactions 24, no. 4 
(April 1998): 315–343, doi: 10.1080/03050629808434934, 333.  
41 Alastair Smith, “Extended Deterrence,” 334. 
42 Timothy W. Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 2003), 10.  
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In Warring Friends, Jeremy Pressman counters Crawford’s pivotal deterrence 
argument. Pressman argues that nations also form alliances with other nations to prevent 
their ally from attacking another nation.43 Where Crawford’s pivotal deterrence model 
emphasized refraining from establishing alliances as a measure of deterrence; Pressman’s 
alliance restraint model involves a mixture of alliance and deterrence simultaneously.44 He 
further argues that alliance restraint “could be a powerful tool for tampering down violence 
and confrontation” to maintain international stability.45 
d. Alliances Form to Ensure Political Survival 
Anessa L. Kimball offers a last school of thought, which contends that alliances are 
formed when a nation’s government is determined to ensure their political survival. In her 
2010 article “Political Survival, Policy Distribution, and Alliance Formation,” she 
advocates against alliance formation arguments based on security and threats.46 Kimball 
combines the distribution dilemma theory and political survival theory to show that a state 
seeks alliances when it government is concerned with resource management and political 
survival.47 In the distribution dilemma, national security and social policy are resources 
that represent the “guns and butter,” which government uses to satisfy the needs of its 
constituency.48 In the political survival theory, a government must properly use resources 
to meet the demands of the constituency. The government can then secure votes when re-
elections occur.49 
                                                 
43 Jeremy Pressman, Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International Politics (New York: 
Cornell University Press, 2008), 4.  
44 Pressman, Warring Friends, 4–5.  
45 Pressman, Warring Friends, 135.  
46 Anessa Kimball, “Political Survival, Policy Distribution, and Alliance Formation,” Journal of 
Peace Research 47, no. 4 (July 2010): 407.  
47 Kimball, “Political Survival,” 407.  
48 Kimball, “Political Survival,” 408. See also Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1999), Chapter 2, for a more detailed explanation on the guns and butter trade-
off.  
49 Kimball, “Political Survival,” 408. For more information, also see Bueno de Mesquita et al., The 
Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).  
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2. Great Power–Small Power Alliances
With various reasons behind alliance formation, it is important to explore what a 
small power can hope to gain by allying with a great power and vice versa. In a great-small 
power alliance, both sides maximize the benefits that their counterparts provide. 
Furthermore, both use their own leverage to gain advantage in the alliance. By doing so, 
they gain the opportunity in maximizing those desired benefits. This section reviews two 
schools of thought. First, scholars have demonstrated how small powers are able to 
leverage their advantage over great powers, and second, scholars counter by showing that 
greater powers maintain advantage by their leverage when allied with a smaller power. 
a. Small Powers Leverage Great Powers
Some scholars claim that small powers can use their leverage over great powers. In 
his 1971 article “The Big Influence of Small Allies,” political scientist Robert O. Keohane 
used the United States’ established alliances with weaker powers as an example of how 
small powers have gained leverage over great powers.50 He claimed the United States 
becomes captive to smaller power demands because foreign policy continues to have 
priority over domestic policy.51 Thus, smaller power allies can maintain leverage over the 
United States in their bargaining because they have ensured commitment of the greater 
power.52  
Scholar Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov also concurs with Keohane’s argument that small 
states have gained the advantage over the United States within the great power-small power 
alliance. In Alliance Theory: U.S.-Small Allies Relationships, Bar-Siman-Tov makes three 
proposals that could bring balance within the relationship between the United States and 
its small allies. First, he argues that the United States needs to place its national interests 
as the priority when conducting relationships with its allies.53 Second, the United States 
50 Robert O. Keohane, “The Big Influence of Small Allies,” Foreign Policy, no. 2 (Spring 1971): 161.
51 Keohane, “The Big Influence of Small Allies,” 182.
52 Keohane, “The Big Influence of Small Allies,” 162–163, 181.
53 Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, “Alliance Strategy: U.S.—Small Allies Relationships,” Journal of
Strategic Studies 3, no. 2 (1980): 210, doi: 10.1080/01402398008437046.  
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needs to prioritize the strategic importance of its allies with respect to its national 
interests.54 Finally, the United States needs to implement a situational concept of 
commitment.55 He acknowledges that the United States would face difficulty in achieving 
these proposals due to the contradictions within its national interests.56 
In “Davids and Goliaths,” Sheldon W. Simon suggests that regional actors have the 
capability to “constrain or manipulate greater power policies.”57 He claims great powers 
seek to use third world states to further enhance their own power and to balance against 
other hostile great powers.58 While greater powers compete against one another for global 
dominance, smaller powers become beneficiaries because greater powers are willing to 
form an alliance with them so as to achieve dominance. Thus, Simon concludes that small 
states gain greater leverage as their greater power counterparts provide them with military 
and economic assistance.59 
In a 1966 article in International Organization, author Robert L. Rothstein argues 
that since time has progressed into a period wherein political power matters more than 
military power, small power states prefer nonalignment since they are more capable of 
survival.60 Previously, small powers had sought to form alliances with one great power 
when they faced the military threat of another greater power.61 However, Rothstein 
suggests that now that political struggles between great powers dictate their conflict, small 
powers use this to their advantage. Finally, he also notes that the small power gains 
                                                 
54 Bar-Siman-Tov, “Alliance Strategy,” 210.  
55 Bar-Siman-Tov, “Alliance Strategy,”210.  
56 Bar-Siman-Tov, “Alliance Strategy,” 214.  
57 Sheldon W. Simon, “Davids and Goliaths: Small Power-Great Power Security Relations in 
Southeast Asia,” Asian Survey 23, no. 3 (1983): 314.  
58 Simon, “Davids and Goliaths,” 302.  
59 Simon, “Davids and Goliaths,” 305.  
60 Robert L. Rothstein, “Alignment, Nonalignment, and Small Powers: 1945–1965,” International 
Organization 20, no. 3 (Summer 1966): 397–418, 417.  
61 Rothstein, “Alignment, Nonalignment, and Small Powers,” 405.  
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advantage over their greater power ally because the greater power is determined to ensure 
their small power ally is not defeated.62 
b. Great Powers Leverage Small Powers  
While there is evidence that small powers can gain advantage over a greater power, 
one can argue the opposite. In their 2017 article “China and Lilliputians,” authors Hoo 
Tiang Boon and Charles Ardy argue that China uses economic leverage to impose their 
will upon smaller states that are economically undeveloped.63 To further its self-
determination for global expansion, China uses its influence to lure smaller power state 
into establishing economic ties.64 For China, these small power states represent not only 
resource security, but they also play a role in the political arena, as they tend to side with 
China’s global policy objectives.65 For the smaller states, China is a pathway to achieving 
economic prosperity.66 
In the 2016 article “Alliance Theory and Alliance Shelter,” political scientists 
Alyson J. K. Bailes, Bradley A. Thayer, and Baldur Thorhallsson have developed the 
“alliance shelter theory” wherein a great-small power alliance, a small power retains 
effective control in certain areas of an alliance while giving the greater power advantage 
to control other areas.67 They argue this occurs because small states fear their vulnerability 
and seek alliance with greater powers as a shelter to ensure their survival. 
                                                 
62 Rothstein, “Alignment, Nonalignment, and Small Powers,” 416.  
63 Hoo Tiang Boon and Charles Ardy, “China and Lilliputians: Small States in a Big Power’s 
Evolving Foreign Policy,” Asian Security 13, no. 2 (March 2017): 117, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2017.1286159.  
64 Boon and Ardy, “China and Lilliputians,” 117.  
65 Boon and Ardy, “China and Lilliputians,” 117.  
66 Boon and Ardy, “China and Lilliputians,” 117.  
67 Alyson J. K. Bailes, Bradley A. Thayer, and Baldur Thorhallsson, “Alliance Theory and Alliance 
‘Shelter’: The Complexities of Small State Alliance Behavior,” Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal 1, 
no. 1 (August 2016): 9–26, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23802014.2016.1189806, 10.  
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3. China and North Korea’s Alliance Behavior 
The previous sections discussed why alliances form and how leverage can exist 
within a great-small power alliance. This section covers China and North Korea’s alliance. 
Some argue that the two nations share strong relationship ties with one another because of 
the alliance itself. Others claim that China and North Korea are more enemies than friends, 
and the alliance only makes them tolerant of one another. When considering how leverage 
plays a role, two schools of thought emerge. In the first, scholars claim that North Korea’s 
has greater leverage, and this limits China’s power over North Korea, and in the second, 
scholars claim that China has greater leverage, which enables it to control North Korea’s 
behavior. 
a. North Korea Has Greater Leverage  
While some scholars argue that China has greater leverage over North Korea, other 
scholars counter with the claim that there are factors that give North Korea leverage over 
China. One school of thought is that China’s dependence on North Korea’s internal 
stability gives North Korea leverage. Another school of thought is that North Korea’s 
resiliency and its ability to maintain distant ties with China gives it leverage. 
Jooyoung Song claims that China has a geopolitical and strategic interest in 
maintaining an alliance with North Korea and ensuring their stability. In “Understanding 
China’s Response to North Korea’s Provocations,” Song developed the “dual threats 
model” to provide analysis of China’s response to North Korea’s provocations against 
other nations.68 He used U.S. military response to provocations and the stability of North 
Korea as variables in various case studies to show that China weighs these factors when 
determining if their response is necessary.69 He has determined that because China fears 
instability of North Korea, it prevents China from exerting too much pressure onto North 
Korea.70 
                                                 
68 Jooyoung Song, “Understanding China’s Response to North Korea’s Provocations,” Asian Survey 
51, no. 6 (November/December 2011): 1134–1155, 1135.  
69 Song, “Understanding China’s Response,” 1135.  
70 Song, “Understanding China’s Response,” 1154.  
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Jae Ho Chung and Dr. Myung-hae Choi make their accounts of China and North 
Korean relations in “Uncertain Allies or Uncomfortable Neighbors.” Historically, the two 
countries have faced common enemies in war (Japan and the United States), and this makes 
geostrategic consideration a high priority.71 The authors note that while the two have 
attempted steps toward building a stronger alliance, there are examples of road blocks to 
this progression, such as North Korea’s continued suspicion of China’s intentions, North 
Korea’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities negatively impacting China’s strategic interests, and 
North Korea’s record of provocative actions.72 They suggest China’s influence over North 
Korea is limited, noting that North Korea knows how to use its vulnerability to its 
advantage in influencing greater powers.73 The authors predict that China’s alliance with 
North Korea will eventually become more of a liability than benefit for China.74 Their 
conclusions correlate with Song’s stance that while China has the power in this 
relationship, this power has clear limitations. 
In his 2012 book The Impossible State, Victor Cha refers to the China and North 
Korean alliance as a “mutual-hostage” relationship.75 He argues that China is willing to 
sacrifice its international reputation at the expense of ensuring that North Korea does not 
collapse, and this gives North Korea the advantage over China. On the other hand, North 
Korea, is captive to economic pressures placed upon it by China because North Korea relies 
heavily on China for economic support.76 Thus, Andrei Lankov’s claim that China and 
North Korea are not strongly tied correlates with Victor Cha’s claim. 
Kenneth Pomeranz argues there is a misconception of China’s ability to unilaterally 
compel North Korea to abandon nuclear ambitions and cease provocations. He identifies 
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76 Cha, The Impossible State, 344.  
 16 
China’s internal domestic politics and North Korea’s fragility as obstacles for China. 
Regarding domestic issues, he believes that China perceives internal corruption as a greater 
threat to security over North Korea issues.77 North Korea knows China depends on its 
stability, and uses this dependency to be defiant because it knows that China will not cut it 
off diplomatically or economically.78 
James Kynge, principal of China Confidential and Renminbi Compass, believes 
that although China has established deep economic relations with the United States, its 
alliance with North Korea is derived from a common struggle against western powers.79 
He argues that while China exerts economic pressures on North Korea to de-escalate 
tension, it will not go to the extreme of creating a crisis for the Kim regime. Moreover, 
China is willing to tolerate North Korea’s hermit behavior and pursuit of nuclear 
capabilities. However, China cannot tolerate a regime collapse that could open the door for 
U.S. expansion along its borders.80 
b. China Has Greater Leverage 
As various scholars argue that North Korea has leverage over China, other scholars 
contend that China has leverage over North Korea because it depends on China’s economic 
support. For example, Eleanor Albert contends, “China is North Korea’s most important 
ally, biggest trading partner, and main source of food and energy,” as it accounts for 
approximately 90 percent of North Korea’s trade.81 Furthermore, while other countries 
have ceased to provide food aid to North Korea since 2009, China continues to do so.82 
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Similarly, Nicholas Eberstadt, senior advisor to the National Bureau of Asian 
Research, argues, “China is currently North Korea’s only economic backer of any 
importance.”83 Eberstadt holds North Korea’s record of bad state policies, government 
practice, and degradation of the institutions as part of the reason that the hermit kingdom 
has experienced economic woes and will continue to depend on China’s assistance.84 
Dick Manto and Mark Manyin position correlates to that of both Albert and 
Eberstadt. They argue that China gains influence over North Korea by providing support 
to their economy. Additionally, they claim that China uses their economic support as 
leverage to punish North Korea’s bad behavior, and reward North Korea’s good behavior.85 
Sino-North Korean analyst Sabine van Ameijden has conversely claimed that North 
Korea is not a burden but a crucial ally for China.86 She contends that North Korea’s 
nuclear capabilities reinforce China’s deterrence strategy. North Korea’s test of nuclear 
weapons deters against U.S. expansion and against countries in island disputes with China. 
She notes that for China, North Korea is its faithful German shepherd that will bark when 
China orders it to.87 
In The Real North Korea, Andrei Lankov claims that China views North Korea’s 
provocative actions as harmful to stability and its long-term strategic goals.88 For North 
Korea, it prefers to “keep Beijing at arm’s length” to avoid loss of influence over its 
society.89 Lankov contends that there is misconception that China’s economic influence 
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over North Korea does not give it political leverage.90 A South Korean diplomat once told 
him, “China doesn’t have leverage when it comes to dealing with North Korea. What it has 
is not a lever, but rather a hammer. China can knock North Korea unconscious if it wishes, 
but it cannot really manipulate its behavior.”91 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The purpose of this thesis is to understand what leverage China has over North 
Korea within their alliance. Part of answering this question involves understanding why 
China and North Korea value the alliance. In turn, I propose three hypotheses regarding 
the use of leverage within the China and North Korean alliance. I acknowledge that while 
I portray these three propositions separately, this study may reveal all three propositions 
exist simultaneously. The first hypothesis speculates that China is reluctant to use its 
leverages over North Korea. However, the second hypothesis speculates that China is 
indeed willing to use its leverage under certain conditions, while the third hypothesis 
speculates that North Korea will become more defiant of China under certain conditions. 
Because China may choose to use its leverage over North Korea, the concluding chapter 
of this study analyzes whether its leverage alone is enough to force North Korea to alter its 
behavior.  
1. Hypothesis 1: Maintaining Stability and Limiting Outside Influence 
Matters More than Using Leverage 
My first hypothesis is that China is reluctant to use leverage over North Korea 
because China values stability. Their alliance enables them both to maintain power over 
their societies, and both countries share a common interest of limiting outside influences 
(i.e., the United States) from threatening their respective power. North Korea perceives its 
ability to deter adversaries with its nuclear arsenal and provocative actions as a 
legitimization of power. China values the effective deterrence that comes with North 
Korea’s aggression because it prevents the expansion of outside influence over its people. 
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The governing systems for both countries are historically based on the ideals of 
communism and authoritarianism. For North Korea, the regime follows a cult of 
personality for the supreme leader that uses authoritative measures to keep the society 
dependent on its power. For example, the government controls food distribution, heavily 
uses propaganda, restricts flow of information from the outside world, and is willing to 
publicly punish anyone willing to oppose its authority.  
For China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is a single-party system that also 
will implement measures to keep its society dependent on its rule. China is also known to 
use nationalistic propaganda and to restrict information flow, use violent measures to 
control population rates, and severely punish those found to criticize or challenge the ruling 
party. The coercive measures taken by China and North Korea support the notion that an 
increase of outside influence will only threaten the control both governments have over 
their societies. This hypothesis conforms to existing literature that suggests that balancing 
against perceived threats will drive state alliances. 
2. Hypothesis 2: China Will Leverage If North Korea’s Actions Cause 
Destabilization 
The second hypothesis suggests that China is likely to use its leverage to influence 
North Korea whenever its actions cause destabilization and threatens China’s diplomatic 
relations with other nations. While China seeks to become a superpower in the Pacific 
theater, achieving this objective also depends on maintaining leverage over North Korea. 
China’s strategic objectives will be compromised if it is dragged into an unwanted war 
caused by North Korea’s aggression. Therefore, China is likely to use leverage over North 
Korea if its behavior increases likelihood of sparking an armed conflict in the region. Either 
the strength of China’s leverage will force North Korea to concede, or it will continue to 
remain defiant. 
3. Hypothesis 3: North Korea Will Become More Defiant If China 
Allows Outside Threats to Disrupt their Alliance 
The third hypothesis contends that North Korea is likely to become more defiant of 
China whenever it perceives that China is allowing outside threats to disrupt their alliance. 
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While North Korea pursues increased capabilities for self-defense, it also depends on 
China’s willingness to come to its defense. For North Korea, an increase of outside 
influence may cause China to devalue the alliance, encouraging it to betray North Korea. 
Because North Korea understands that China depends on its survival, it is likely to be 
defiant of China’s demands whenever it perceives a threat to the alliance. For example, 
North Korea perceives that the United States is attempting to turn China against it by 
pressuring China to strain its economic relations with North Korea with increased sanctions 
to press for a non-nuclear North Korea. Either China will be pressured by North Korea’s 
defiance or China will pursue strengthening its relations with the international community. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis includes an in-depth analysis of the China and North Korean alliance. 
First, this research presents a historical background narrative of key events that influenced 
China and North Korea’s alliance formation. Next, analysis covers North Korea’s pursuit 
of nuclear weapons and the first nuclear crisis. Following this, is an analysis of the second 
nuclear crisis and Six Party Talks. Finally, I analyze how China’s leverage has shaped its 
relationship with North Korea. To complete this research, I have used scholarly sources 
such as recorded documentaries, academic books, journal articles, Internet blogs, news 
articles, economic charts and diagrams, and other scholarly material deemed relevant to 
this study. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis is composed of five chapters. Chapter I, the introduction for the thesis, 
thus far has encompassed the background as to why alliances are formed, why great and 
small powers ally with one another, and how leverage impacts alliance behavior. 
Additionally, it has included the introduction of the thesis question, significance of the 
thesis question, literature review, possible explanations and hypothesis, and the research 
design implementation. 
Chapter II begins by covering the historical background behind the China and North 
Korean alliance with historical details leading up to the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid 
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and Cooperation Friendship Treaty.92 This chapter analyzes key events after the split that 
led up to the Korean War, and the factors that influenced China’s decision to come to North 
Korea’s defense. The end of the chapter discusses diplomatic relations between China and 
North Korea since the official establishment of their alliance in 196193 and how political 
leverage has affected relations between the two countries. Chapter III analyzes China’s 
influence over North Korea during the first and second nuclear crises. Then, Chapter IV 
includes an in-depth analysis of China’s influence over North Korea during the Six Party 
Talks. Finally, Chapter V, the final chapter, concludes by summarizing my findings 
regarding the importance of leverage within the China and North Korean alliance, and 
determines whether China’s use of leverage alone is enough to achieve the desired 
outcomes it seeks from its relationship with North Korea.  
Drawing from the hypotheses stated earlier, there are two possible implications. On 
one hand, China refrains from using leverage because maintaining stability and preventing 
outside influence matters more. On the other hand, the research may reveal that China is 
likely to use leverage or North Korea is driven to defiance whenever one ally perceives 
that the other is allowing self-interests to threaten the alliance and their respective states 
security. By understanding the importance of leverage within the alliance, these 
implications may further guide U.S. foreign policy toward China and North Korea. 
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II. BLOOD OR WATER? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter includes a case study contending that while China and North Korea 
both act to reinforce their power and autonomy over their respective societies, relations 
between them may not be as close as we might think. North Korea’s alliance with China 
serves their long-term strategic goals of ensuring its doors remain closed to the outside 
world, but they are willing to demonstrate defiant behavior against their greater power ally 
whenever their autonomy is being challenged. While China may at times become infuriated 
by North Korea, they remain tolerant of their defiant behavior because China fears the 
potential costs associated with abandoning them altogether. Thus, if an analogy could be 
procured to conceptualize the Sino-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) 
relationship, I would go so far as to say that China is not looking to have North Korea over 
for dinner, and North Korea is not seeking an invite, but they stick together because neither 
wants their menu options dictated by foreign powers. 
This chapter covers the Korean War and the driving factors that led to the Sino-
DPRK alliance. First, I discuss North Korea’s attempt to unify the Korean peninsula by 
force and China’s decision to enter the Korean War in defense of North Korea. Second, I 
discuss how negative perceptions of the Soviet Union contribute to China and North Korea 
allying with one another. Finally, I evaluate how the history between China and North 
Korea has contributed to the sustainment of their alliance thus far, and conclude that, 
because both China and North Korea are committed to ensuring that they can independently 
pursue their own strategic agendas, this has made sustaining the Sino-DPRK alliance more 
valuable to each than ending it. 
B. NORTH KOREA: UNITY UNDER ITS TERMS 
Scholars often describe Korea as a closed society. For example, in Korea’s Place 
in the Sun, Bruce Cumings describes Korea as the “hermit kingdom”94 and quotes historian 
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Key-Hiuk Kim, who termed North Korean character as “exclusionism.”95 Both terms 
indicate Korea’s desire of maintaining control over its own destiny, and it has been 
successful in keeping its doors closed to the outer world.  
For both Koreas, achieving national reunification symbolized recapturing self-
determination, and this has been worth fighting for. After Japan defeated China in 1905, 
Korea became hostage to Japanese colonialism, and its colonial powers effectively stripped 
Korea of its power of self-determination. After Japan’s defeat in World War II, both North 
and South Koreans wanted to receive reclamation of their self-determination. Instead, after 
World War II ended, the United States and Russia, both non-Korean, split Korea into two.96 
The Soviet Union placed Kim Il Sung as the head of what became North Korea. Kim Il 
Sung was a founder of the Korean Communist movement and guerilla fighter who had 
fought against Japan in World War II, and this made him useful for the Soviet Union.97 
The United States placed Syngman Rhee in charge in what became South Korea.98 
Syngman Rhee was a political figure who had spent many years in America lobbying for 
Korean independence and alliance guarantees from other nations, and his diplomatic 
connections made him useful for the United States.99 Both Syngman Rhee and Kim Il Sung 
fully understood that reunifying both Koreas meant that one of them would have to give 
up their position of power. This emboldened Kim to make the first move. 
However, North Korea could not go outside to play with other nations without 
getting permission from its parent, the Soviet Union. While Kim Il Sung wanted to reunify 
the Korean peninsula under his terms, he also understood that without support from the 
Soviet Union, launching an attack upon the South would be pointless. After all, it was 
Stalin who had given Kim his power over North Korea and aided him in bolstering “a 
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political base and a national image.”100 Stalin’s goal in North Korea was to prop up what 
appeared to be an independent and self-sufficient nation in the international community. 
However, Stalin was successful in this as the international community remained unaware 
that he was using his power to manage North Korea behind the scenes.101 One of the main 
reasons Stalin sought this arrangement was so that if a conflict were to stem from North 
Korean aggression, the Soviet Union would not be deemed directly responsible or 
implicated. 
Diplomatic engagement proved itself ineffective as border fighting between the 
North and the South took place along the 38th parallel in 1949.102 A hostile takeover of 
South Korea began to look more promising for Kim Il Sung since he already had guerillas 
in the South carrying out random attacks and spreading propaganda supporting 
reunification under DPRK power.103 Kim Il Sung saw this advantage as a reason to press 
Stalin even harder for the green light to conduct an offensive.104 Stalin likely perceived that 
a successful attack and takeover of South Korea would further strengthen the Communist 
bloc, which in turn would cause the United States to lose more influence in the Pacific 
region; yet, he also wanted to avoid direct military engagement with the United States so 
soon after World War II.105 
Stalin withheld his approval to Kim Il Sung for military action until the conditions 
were more favorable for a North Korean offensive.106 Two critical factors influenced 
Stalin’s shift toward supporting a North Korean invasion of the South. First, the United 
States seemed to be backing away from it security commitments with South Korea, which 
meant if a full-scale war did emerge, there was a good chance that the United States would 
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not get involved, meaning the Soviet Union would less likely encounter a direct military 
conflict against their powerful rival.107 Second, and more critically, the Soviet Union 
normalized relations with China and officially established the Sino-Soviet alliance on 
February 14, 1950.108 This alliance gave the Soviet Union leeway in allowing North Korea 
to conduct the invasion it was begging to carry out while employing China to come to its 
defense if the United States decided to intervene. The Soviet Union could afford to gamble 
at this point because its risk had been decreased by the China factor, North Korea’s military 
standing compared to the South, and signs of U.S. noninterference. The Soviet’s calculus 
served Kim’s ambition with regard to launching an attack to takeover South Korea. The 
only barrier at this point was the Soviet Union’s allowance for invading the South on the 
condition that China agreed to defend North Korea. From this reason, Stalin coerced Kim 
Il Sung into actively seeking out Mao, and Kim understood that Stalin’s approval was 
predicated on Mao’s agreement. This in turn, placed North Korea in a situation where it 
needed both Russia and China’s agreement to invade the South. 
C. CHINA: A WAR FAR FROM FORGOTTEN 
Mao foresaw potential benefits in establishing an alliance with the Soviet Union. 
First, because the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) defeated the Kuomintang (KMT) in 
the Chinese Civil War, Mao now could further consolidate his power internally and lead 
his people down the path of revolution.109 However, after years of fighting brought a major 
setback to the mainland, the country needed time to rebuild, and Mao was convinced that 
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China’s economy would recover much more quickly with Soviet aid.110 Second, the United 
States’ nonrecognition of the CCP and continued support of the KMT represented an 
obstruction preventing Mao from reuniting Taiwan with mainland China.111 Finally, the 
historical theme of China’s warring against “foreign imperialist aggression”112 and desire 
to push imperialist powers out of the Pacific region made siding with the communist bloc 
more favorable.113 With the Soviet Union on his side, Mao could “restore China’s central 
position in the international community,”114 while the United States would be deterred from 
blocking his path.115 
Even so, Mao was not enthused by Kim and Stalin’s plan to overtake the South by 
force.116 To put his reluctance into perspective, two factors should be considered: 1) the 
Japanese had already wreaked havoc within China’s borders during its occupation, and 2) 
infighting between the CCP and KMT resurged shortly after WWII and continued for 
another three years until the KMT retreated to Taiwan. Additionally, Mao perceived the 
United States as the CCP’s immediate threat since its position sided with the KMT, and he 
feared the United States would intervene during the Chinese Civil War.117 While Mao may 
have wanted nothing more than the disappearance of U.S. influence in Asia, China was 
overdue for a break from war, since it had just experienced a long conflict Japan during the 
World War II era and the civil war with the KMT. At this point, entering any struggle that 
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would lead to a direct conflict with the United States was not in Mao’s best interest because 
he wanted to focus on the reconstruction of China. More importantly, the KMT could 
regain power over China if he was defeated by the United States.118  
The truth of the matter was that establishing the Sino-Soviet pact also indebted 
Beijing to Moscow. Mao was convinced that Kim was going to carry out his plan regardless 
if he consented to defending him.119 Nevertheless, he pressed Kim to hold off from 
launching an attack against South Korea. However, Stalin ended up supporting Kim’s thirst 
for reunification of the peninsula, and, once Kim came back with Stalin’s approval, Mao 
had no choice but to commit his forces to defend North Korea because he could not risk 
the perception of that he was betraying the communist bloc. While Mao actively pressed 
Stalin to back him in the recovery of Taiwan, he was forced to put its own revolutionary 
agenda on the backburner to prove his loyalty to Stalin.120 One must recognize the bigger 
picture at play in the situation. Mao’s decision to defend North Korea was not about 
satisfying Kim’s lust for reunifying the Korean peninsula, it was about gaining more 
ground toward getting the Soviet Union’s help in retrieving Taiwan to make China whole 
again. 
Mao could use the Korean War to further consolidate the CCP’s power over its 
population as the party was seen as saving North Korea from imperialist aggression.121 
Additionally, like Stalin and Kim, Mao also bought into the notion that the United States 
was backing away from defending South Korea and Taiwan.122 However, this belief was 
abandoned when North Korea launched their invasion against the South, only to be 
knocked back across the 38th parallel by U.S. ground forces, who, despite warnings from 
China not to cross north of the 38th parallel, disregarded the warning because they were 
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determined to further their offensive to overtake the peninsula.123 The invasion confirmed 
Mao’s worst fears as the United States continued North, and two factors made it inevitable 
for Mao to order his forces into battle. First, Mao feared U.S. progression would deepen 
into Chinese territory, and he wanted to avoid bringing the fight directly to his borders.124 
Second, the invasion not only caused the United States to come to South Korea’s defense 
but also triggered the United States’ decision to send its carriers in the Taiwan Straits as a 
blockade, sending an alarming signal to Mao that the United States also would not give up 
Taiwan without a fight.125 
The Korean War lasted for three years until an armistice was finally signed by the 
North and South on July 27, 1953.126 While some refer to this three-year long battle as the 
“Forgotten War,”127 China can never forget how North Korea’s thirst for blood interfered 
with its strategic objectives and caused many deaths for its citizens. What also cannot be 
denied is that the Forgotten War glorified the competition between communism and 
capitalism. Additionally, because both China and North Korea were on the same side, one 
less barrier stood in the way for formalizing a possible alliance. The next barrier that broke 
between China and North Korea was their combined interest of loosening ties with the 
Soviet Union to gain more autonomy. 
D. CHINA AND NORTH KOREA: BREAKING AWAY FROM THE 
SOVIET’S STRONGHOLD 
After the Korean War, the strong communist front held upward by the three united 
powers began to weaken. According to Ilpyong J. Kim, the connection between China, 
North Korea, and the Soviet Union was one of “triangular relations.”128 In reflecting on the 
period between 1945 and 1953, his interpretation holds credible considering that the Soviet 
Union stood at the top of the triangle while China and North Korea were at the lower 
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triangular points. However, after the Korean War ended, this solid triangle formed by solid 
lines had shifted its entire form and morphed into three horizontal nodes connected by a 
singular line. The two stationary end nodes on this line represented China and the Soviet 
Union, while the mobile middle node maneuvering between the stationary end nodes 
represented North Korea. This transformation resulted in two emerging alliances within 
the communist camp. As a result, instead of a unified front among the allies, diverging 
interests fostered, and decreased the overall strength of the communist front, as China and 
North Korea both viewed the Soviet Union as a revisionist power.  
For Mao, the ending of the Korean War allowed him to refocus on China’s 
development, build upon the domestic support he gained from winning the Chinese Civil 
War, and channel it toward fulfilling his own revolutionary objectives.129 Mao not only 
wanted China to be recognized as an “equal power”130 to the Soviet Union, he also saw 
himself as the true leader of communism who should be leading the ongoing revolution 
after Stalin died.131 Both the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution agendas were a 
way to break away from the Soviet Union’s control. Moreover, if Mao could successfully 
demonstrate China’s power and self-sustainability internally and externally, his position as 
the new head of the communist camp would be further justified both within his society as 
well as within the international domain.132 
In a similar fashion, the end of the Korean War allowed Kim Il Sung to further build 
up his domestic power. The society in North Korea already believed that Kim liberated 
North Koreans from the Japanese aggressors during WWII, and, by tampering with history 
once more, his power over society elevated tremendously as his people now believed that 
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he had also forced the Americans to retreat during the Korean War.133 Thus, in the war’s 
aftermath, Kim became praised as the “Great Leader,”134 and he was also symbolized as 
the “protector” and the “mother” of North Korea.135 To further consolidate his power, Kim 
instituted Organizational Life meetings to continuously re-indoctrinate the society on his 
achievements and the importance of remaining loyal to him.136 Additionally, he also 
ensured every neighborhood belonged to an inminban, a local resident who worked with 
local authorities to punish any members of society suspected of challenging or criticizing 
Kim’s power.137  
After the Korean War, Kim instituted the juche ideology,138 which reinforced the 
theme of “national spirit and political sovereignty.”139 Kim played up the credibility of 
juche to his society, and downplayed the reality that North Korea heavily depended on the 
economic strength of both China and the Soviet Union.140 Externally, the ideology also 
served Kim’s goal of demonstrating to the international community that North Korea was 
a self-sufficient nation that did not need to rely on its big brothers to survive. Essentially, 
Kim wanted North Korea to maintain its “doing things our way”141 approach without 
having to worry about foreign interference by China and the Soviet Union. Therefore, it is 
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hard to deny that Kim viewed Khrushchev’s “de-Stalinization”142 policy approach and his 
criticism of North Korea as an “isolationist”143 and “closed society”144 as a threat to his 
own power, and this made forming an alliance with China favorable. 
E. CONCLUSION: POWER BEFORE FRIENDSHIP 
This chapter has traced the basis of China and North Korea’s alliance to the Korean 
War. Also, it has shown that before tackling the issue of how closely tied China and North 
Korea are in terms of relations, one must first understand what drove the two nations to 
become allies and why they have thus far remained allies. I charge that three factors have 
allowed the alliance between China and North Korea to sustain thus far: 1) the shared 
experience of each other’s territory historically invaded by foreign aggressors; 2) the 
shared experience of having to be a junior power to the Soviet Union; and 3) their desire 
to maintain the preservation of self-determination. This is not to say that both countries are 
highly keen of one another or seek to walk hand-in-hand. Rather, China understands North 
Korea wants to fulfill its own agendas without being bothered, just as much as China itself 
does. Therefore, while both countries have established an alliance to ensure their power 
and autonomy is maintained, their relations remain loosely tied to safeguard 
noninterference on both ends.  
After the Korean War, competition between communism and capitalism ensued 
during the Cold War; however, hostility also emerged between members of the communist 
camp. As I have shown, the fundamental reason for conflict in the communist camp 
underlying these factors was that both Mao and Kim wanted to prevent the Soviet Union 
from sabotaging their positions of power. Both leaders recognized they were in the best 
position to solidify their ruling authority over their respective societies, and both leaders 
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came to share perceptions that the Soviet Union as a “revisionist power”145 and “traitor”146 
to the communist ideology. Therefore, because the Soviet Union threatened both leaders’ 
legitimacy, balancing against the Soviet Union was in both Mao and Kim’s best interests. 
Additionally, both Mao and Kim perceived that if they had remained closely tied to the 
Soviet Union, they not only risked forfeiting their opportunity to be able to further solidify 
their power internally, but they also risked being unable to pursue their own desired 
individual agendas. Thus, understanding the historical underpinnings that underlie the 
China and North Korean relationship from this perspective provides context for the 
question as to whether their relationship is currently comparable to the “lips and teeth”147 
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III. NUCLEAR PURSUIT AND NUCLEAR DEFIANCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Scholars continue to debate whether the Sino-DPRK alliance is bounded by strong 
diplomatic relations comparable to the “lips and teeth”148 analogy or if the bonds are 
severely overestimated. While China and North Korea remain allied with one another, 
North Korea’s historical record of defying China continues to resonate. There are two 
implications to consider when further assessing their alliance. First, the foundation of their 
diplomatic relationship is based more on preserving their own self-interests than on 
preserving strong sibling ties. Second, when either ally pushes its own self-interests above 
the alliance foundation, their relationship becomes further strained.  
North Korea perceives three benefits of possessing nuclear weapons: 1) an effective 
deterrence against outsider aggression, 2) reinforcement of the juche ideology,149 and 3) 
the ability to counter the United States’ support of South Korea.150 North Korea’s continued 
mistrust of the international community, combined with the regime’s desire to hold onto 
power, emboldens it to continue pursuing nuclear weapons no matter the cost. However, 
China desires a denuclearized Korean peninsula so that its own strategic goals are not 
compromised by North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Consequently, China is forced to 
decrease tensions and ensure stability whenever its smaller power ally takes provocative 
actions against the international community. For North Korea, going against China’s 
wishes for its denuclearization is a risk worth taking because its nuclear weapons 
ownership, thus far, has guaranteed its security against outside threats. As a result, China’s 
influence has not been enough to force its denuclearization. Therefore, I argue that although 
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China remains North Korea’s sole and greater power ally, China must also depend on the 
international community because its political leverage alone is not enough to alter North 
Korea’s defiant behavior.  
The first nuclear crisis arose after the United States in 1992 discovered North 
Korea’s covert pursuit of nuclear weapons. While China chose to have a limited role during 
the first nuclear crisis, President Jimmy Carter’s intervention led to a resolution between 
the United States and North Korea. After both the United States and North Korea agreed 
to and signed the Agreed Framework on October 21, 1994,151 there was hope that 
conducive relations would foster between them. However, when the international 
community discovered North Korea was violation of this agreement, and it withdrew from 
the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)152 on January 10, 2003.153 Subsequently, this caused a 
second nuclear crisis to arise. Various factors during the second crisis drove China to play 
an active role in getting North Korea to the table for negotiations. However, despite China’s 
active participation during the second nuclear crisis, existing strains within the Sino-DPRK 
alliance continued to fuel North Korea’s defiant behavior. Ultimately, it rejected 
abandoning its nuclear weapons program as a result.  
In this chapter, I examine the following questions. First, what were the reasons 
behind China’s limited influence over North Korea during the first nuclear crisis? Second, 
what were the reasons behind China’s increased influence over North Korea during the 
second nuclear crisis? Third, has the perception that China alone possesses enough political 
leverage to force North Korea to cease pursuing nuclear weapons been severely 
overestimated? Additionally, I examine two factors that shaped China’s limited role during 
the first crisis: 1) China’s decision to move toward integration with the international 
community, and 2) North Korea essentially being forced to develop a nuclear weapon on 
its own, which has reinforced North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. For the second crisis, I 
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examine two factors that allowed China to play an active role: 1) China had become more 
powerful economically through its peaceful rise and did not want conflict disrupting its 
progression, and 2) while China still lacked political influence over North Korea, it 
recognized the recent famine made North Korea more economically vulnerable. Therefore, 
as North Korea’s primary trading partner, it could increase the economic pressure North 
Korea was already experiencing from current international sanctions. This resulted in the 
coercion of North Korea to the negotiation table for Six Party Talks,154 which I address in 
the third chapter.  
I now turn to discussing North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons development 
and China’s limited role during the rise of the first nuclear crisis. After this, I discuss 
China’s active role after the rise of the second nuclear crisis. Finally, I evaluate China’s 
political leverage over North Korea’s nuclear program.  
B. THE NUCLEAR CHASE 
External actors are partly responsible for North Korea’s temptation to use nuclear 
power.155 The temptation to develop nuclear weapons did exist within the northern 
peninsula before the DPRK gained ruling power. During WWII, the Japanese covertly 
moved its nuclear program to the northern Korean peninsula because of rich mineral 
resources and because they feared the U.S. heavy conventional bombing occurring on its 
homeland would destroy its technological advancements.156 The United States ended 
WWII by introducing the world to nuclear destructive power through its bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which forced Japan’s surrender.157 Korea was thus divided with 
communism controlling the North while democracy flourished the South. The split 
provided the Soviet Union opportunity to conduct mining operations for mineral resources 
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in the north to support its own nuclear objectives in 1946.158 It would go on to have a 
successful nuclear weapons test three years later, punching its ticket into the Cold War.159  
On June 25, 1950, Kim Il Sung initiated his military invasion as he tried to overtake 
the South and liberate it from the control of the United States.160 However, the United 
States’ intervention forced his ground forces back north across the 38th parallel, and 
bloodshed continued between North Korea and South Korea for three years until an 
armistice in 1953.161 While Kim Il Sung remained fearsome of possible nuclear attacks 
during the Korean War, the Soviet’s nuclear arsenal proved effective in deterring the 
United States from employing its nuclear arsenal.162 The North Korean elite held a grudge 
against the United States since it had blocked the unification of the peninsula and prevented 
“the Korean race from realizing its full potential.”163 
Following the Korean War, tensions continued to rise between the two countries. 
During the infamous Pueblo incident in 1968, North Korea captured and retained control 
of a U.S. Navy intelligence ship, claiming the vessel had violated its territorial waters.164 
By 1972, the United States had expanded its nuclear arsenal to over 700 nuclear 
warheads.165 Another clash was the Axe incident in 1976, when North Korean forces killed 
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two U.S. soldiers for trimming trees near the Korean Demilitarized Zone.166 The North 
Koreans initially claimed that its actions were purely defensive against the aggressive 
United States.167 The United States retaliated by showing force and chopping down the 
disputed tree, instead of just doing trims.168 To the United States, North Korea was just 
another minion of the Soviet Union attempting to spread the communist ideology. Two 
significant points must be recognized with regard to these incidents. First, the United States 
and North Korea share a history of violent mutual hostility. Second, while another full-
scale war has not erupted, deep resentment still resonates between the two countries, and 
provocations from either side could easily lead to the outbreak of war.  
North Korea solicited the Soviet Union for assistance in jumpstarting its nuclear 
program. The Soviet Union agreed to offer support in peaceful use of nuclear technology 
but not weapons development.169 North Korea began sending scientists and technicians to 
the Soviet Union for nuclear training in 1956.170 Both countries signed a nuclear 
cooperation agreement in 1959,171 and the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center was 
completed by 1964.172 North Korea continued its requests for weapons; however, the 
Soviet Union refused to budge primarily because it wanted to keep the “military know-
how”173 to itself. In retrospect, Kim should have anticipated rejection considering how the 
Soviets handled China’s request for nuclear assistance; it neglected to uphold it nuclear 
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obligations to China after both countries agreed to the 1957 New Defense Technical 
Accord.174 The Soviets chose to abandon the agreement’s terms, informing China of their 
intent to sign arms control agreements with the United States in 1958.175 The Soviet Union 
justified its actions by asserting that its nuclear umbrella provided enough coverage for the 
region.176 The justification undoubtedly brought further damage to the already 
deteriorating relationship between China and Soviet Union.  
Because the Soviet Union continued to refuse to assist him to realize his nuclear 
ambitions, Kim turned to China since it had successfully tested a nuclear weapon.177 The 
Soviet Union and China were competing for influence in North Korea, and Kim believed 
he could gain a yes on nuclear weapons assistance out of China since he had been receiving 
aid from both countries.178 Hoping that Mao could be convinced, Kim sent a letter to Mao 
proclaiming that “as brother countries who shared fighting and dying on the battlefield, 
China and North Korea should also share the atomic secret.”179 However, the Chinese 
consensus was that they did not want to support the proposal financially, arguing that 
investing in a nuclear weapons program would be too expensive for a small country like 
North Korea.180 China regarded North Korea’s nuclear weapons ambitions as something it 
wanted versus something it needed. Therefore, Mao also chose to decline Kim’s request. 
In 1974, Mao stuck to his position after he received another request from Kim after gaining 
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awareness of South Korea’s intent to pursue its own nuclear program.181 For both China 
and the Soviet Union, rendering economic aid to North Korea did not stem from a desire 
to develop a close bond with it. As relations between these greater powers spiraled, they 
continued their economic aid to keep the rogue state from taking a side. Both China and 
the Soviet Union wanted to avoid a balancing scenario, and both understood that North 
Korea proclaiming ownership of a nuclear weapon would only complicate the equation.182  
Kim Il Sung’s skepticism of both China and the Soviet Union only deepened as 
they repeatedly declined his nuclear weapons requests and further drove his decision to 
take matters into his own hands. In turn, Kim Il Sung effectively used his diplomatic ties 
to play China and the Soviet Union against one another for economic aid as their relations 
weakened so that advancements in developing his nuclear weapons could be covertly 
funded. As Victor Cha put it, Kim did not want North Korea to be a “shrimp among 
whales,”183 surrounded by a nuclear China, a nuclear Soviet Union, and the United States 
with nuclear warheads, then deployed in South Korea.184 I now turn to discussing the rise 
of the first nuclear crisis. 
C. THE NORTH’S EXPOSURE 
The United States feared a nuclear weapons capable North Korea, and this fear 
drove them to pressure the Soviet Union in turn to pressure North Korea to sign the NPT.185 
It wanted to prevent North Korea from developing a nuclear weapon in any capacity. As 
for North Korea, it would accept any assistance for its nuclear advancements, so the Soviets 
would not have any challenge in gaining North Korea as a signatory because it gained 
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North Korea technology. In 1985, North Korea agreed to become a member of the NPT in 
exchange for four light-water nuclear reactors from the Soviet Union; however, ensuring 
that North Korea would remain compliant to the treaty has been an entirely different 
story.186  
Some may insist that North Korea intended to comply with the treaty it signed in 
1985. However, its refusal to sign the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)187 
safeguards agreement along with this treaty proves that North Korea never intended to 
uphold its end of the bargain.188 It signed the treaty only to achieve material gains for its 
own nuclear objectives. When the time came for North Korea’s signature in 1987, the 
IAEA mistakenly sent it the wrong inspection agreement, which gave it another 18 months 
before it was required to sign.189 However, even as this new deadline passed, North Korea 
still had not put its signature on the dotted line because withholding its signatory for IAEA 
inspections gave it an additional opportunity to bargain. North Korea proceeded to argue 
that it would not come to any agreement with the IAEA because the United States still had 
nuclear warheads in the South.190 Since it could not make American forces disappear from 
the southern peninsula, perhaps it could get rid of the nuclear warheads instead, which 
would give them an edge over the United States. In 1991, the United States announced that 
all nuclear weapons had been removed from South Korea.191  
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Strategically, North Korea had got rid of the immediate nuclear threat; however, 
now it had put itself at risk of being exposed after it finally signed the agreement with the 
IAEA in 1992.192 The IAEA inspectors found several key discrepancies to confirm U.S. 
suspicions after arriving in North Korea May 1992.193 Of note was a key discrepancy 
between North Korea’s initial report of reprocessing and the IAEA’s findings. North Korea 
had claimed it conducted reprocessing in 1990 due to damaged fuel rods; however, the 
IAEA was able to prove otherwise and that North Korea conducted reprocessing activities 
on three different occasions between the years 1989 and 1991.194 The major clash between 
North Korea and the IAEA came when the IAEA found the disguised plutonium 
reprocessing facilities that correlated with U.S. satellite images.195 When prompting North 
Korea to allow it to inspect these facilities, North Korea denied the IAEA access, which 
led the IAEA to prompt the United Nations (UN) to force North Korea into allowing the 
inspection.196 North Korea responded by announcing its intention of withdrawing from the 
NPT, calling the IAEA “puppets” of U.S. aggression striving to infringe on its sovereign 
rights.197  
There was dilemma over what action was the best course for the international 
community to handle North Korea’s exposure of nuclear activities. One side of the U.S. 
Congress argued that the North Koreans should be punished, while the other side pressed 
for the negotiation approach.198 The Clinton administration contemplated the option of 
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conducting preemptive strikes on known reprocessing facilities in the DPRK.199 However, 
many believed pursuing military action would undoubtedly trigger a war, resulting in a 
costly death toll.200 Others recommended pressing the UN for sanctions against North 
Korea and a buildup forces in South Korea to prepare for possible war with the North; 
however, North Korea saw these actions as provocative.201 With rising tensions 
surrounding the nuclear crisis, only two possible outcomes would ensue—accepting some 
sort of a nuclear deal or committing to an outbreak of bloody war. The international 
community called on China to use its influence over North Korea; however, I argue that 
the international community overestimated China’s influence over North Korea.  
D. CHINA AND THE FIRST NUCLEAR CRISIS 
China played a limited role when the first nuclear crisis erupted for three reasons. 
First, China could not afford the international community to view it as a threat while it 
sought economic integration. China’s previous strategy entailed spreading its own 
revolution throughout Asia while the Soviet Union effectively deterred the United 
States.202 However, the Soviet Union’s collapse allowed the United States to become the 
dominant power in Asia, and China alone could not challenge its influence.203 
Additionally, smaller power nations, such as South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and 
Taiwan, were experiencing prosperity from economic integration, and China wanted to 
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reap those same benefits.204 Therefore, China realized that rising once again would require 
its integration and cooperation with other nations within the international community.205 
However, because China’s outlook toward the world has changed, its interests 
clashed with North Korea’s interests during the first nuclear crisis. Previously, like North 
Korea, Chinese foreign policy was geared toward isolation from the outside world; 
however, China’s change in strategy diverged from North Korea’s desire of ensuring 
isolation. Even with the Soviet Union’s collapse, North Korea’s aims of keeping its doors 
closed, increasing its military power, and reunifying the Korean peninsula under its terms 
remained unchanged.206 Arguably, North Korea perceived China’s “openness” approach 
as following the similar path of a revisionist power, which China, ironically, claimed it had 
previously witnessed within the Soviet Union under Khrushchev.207 In North Korea’s 
view, China was allowing the alliance to be sacrificed so as to fulfill its interest of achieving 
economic gains.  
Second, the Sino-DPRK alliance became further damaged when China willingly 
chose to have normalized relations with South Korea in the early 1990s.208 As Kim noted, 
China’s aim was “maintaining a “special relationship” with Pyongyang, while promoting 
and expanding “normal relations” with Seoul.209 North Korea felt betrayal once before 
when the Soviet Union had also established relations with South Korea and later stopped 
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giving North Korea economic support.210 North Korea was again reliving betrayal, except 
now it came from China. In its view, not only had China refused to help it develop nukes, 
now China was compromising its alliance to appease the puppets in the South.  
Third, maintaining the communist camp placed greater importance on ensuring 
North Korea’s survival. China could not afford to pay the costs of a destabilized North 
Korea, nor could it afford to have relations completely severed. Once the Soviet Union 
collapsed, China was left burdened with providing economic and food assistance to North 
Korea.211 Therefore, for China to join the UN sanction bandwagon would essentially be 
China welcoming North Korean damages it would be unable to pay.212 Additionally, China 
knew any actions taken against North Korea on its own behalf would further drive North 
Korea’s defiance. Thus, China chose to keep pushing for bilateral negotiations between the 
United States and North Korea, in part, to avoid siding with either nation and to keep the 
dialogue going between both nations to avoid a war.213 
In 1994, former President Jimmy Carter’s intervention and diplomacy in the first 
nuclear crisis became the break through toward achieving a resolution between the United 
States and North Korea. Three factors gave Carter leeway in pursuing engagement with 
North Korea. First, Carter already had positive relations with China dating back to his 
presidential term, and China foresaw any outcome that did not result in armed conflict as 
a saving grace.214 Second, continuous invitations from Kim Il Sung convinced him that 
North Korea wanted to avoid a war, motivating him to take advantage of the opportunity 
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for peaceful negotiations before it was too late.215 Third, rising pressure to end the crisis 
drove President Clinton’s decision in giving him the green light, and Carter achieved his 
goal in relaying the message of the North’s willingness to negotiate with the United 
States.216  
In sum, North Korea allowed tensions to escalate to the brink of war because the 
opportunity to gain bargaining power was a risk worth taking. The United States could not 
back down from diplomatic engagement with North Korea because if the international 
community perceived its unwillingness to negotiate, then North Korea’s claim of U.S. 
aggression would be justified. As stated earlier, North Korea wanted to gain an edge over 
the United States, and it achieved this with the withdrawal of nukes from the South. Now 
its continued pursuit of nuclear weapons brought it to a position of bargaining with greater 
powers. Meanwhile, China’s self-interests caused divergence within Sino-DPRK relations 
and led to China having limited influence over their smaller power ally during the first 
nuclear crisis. I now turn to discussing the Agreed Framework’s collapse and the rise of 
the second nuclear crisis. 
E. THE NORTH’S SECOND EXPOSURE 
Both sides came to terms on October 21, 1994. The agreement called for North 
Korea to freeze its nuclear weapons pursuits and recommit to the 1992 joint declaration it 
signed with the South for a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.217 In exchange for its adherence, 
North Korea would gain light water reactors to replace its graphite reactors, an annual 
supply of oil to compensate for the conversion to the alternate source of energy, the 
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establishment of economic and political normalization, and assurance that the United States 
would not threaten them with nuclear weapons.218 The deal appeared clear cut and 
achievable on paper; however, its implementation and duration was the true test of 
assurance between the United States and North Korea.  
The United States was now on the hook to deliver replacement reactors, and a 
quarrel over where the reactors originated from ensued. North Korea expected American-
made reactors, but the United States countered with South Korea’s willingness to supply 
them and Japan’s ability to assist with costs.219 For North Korea, dealing with the United 
States was already perceived as a risk, and it did not want the perception of engaging with 
more historical enemies.220 On the other hand, the United States’ priority lay in getting 
reactors to the North without taking a major hit on its pocket book, opening the door to the 
establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in 
1995.221 Through KEDO, the United States would cover the costs for fuel supplies while 
South Korea and Japan doubled down on the reactor costs.222 After much debate, the 
dispute over reactor origins eventually settled in Kuala Lumpur later that year.223 North 
Korea had not gotten exactly what they wanted, and they did not like being forced to rely 
on Japan and South Korea.  
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More issues followed with North Korea’s various threats to abandon the agreement 
because of dissatisfaction with construction delays and late arrival of fuel shipments.224 
While North Korea may have gained some ground in challenging KEDO’s delays caused 
by financial and contract mismanagement, North Korea certainly lost ground with the 1996 
submarine incident along its firing of a ballistic missile off Japan’s coastal waters in 
1998.225 Despite these issues, the agreement finally collapsed because North Korea again 
was caught playing its nuclear game. In 2002, the United States acquired evidence that 
North Korea traded ballistic missile technology with Pakistan in exchange for technology 
to further its nuclear weapons progression.226 When confronted, North Korea denied having 
a nuclear program while simultaneously arguing its entitlement to nuclear weapons for self-
defense purposes.227 This triggered the United States to stop fuel shipments after 
determining that the North violated the Agreed Framework, and North Korea retaliated by 
kicking out IAEA inspectors and withdrawing from the NPT in January 2003.228 North 
Korea would undergo a massive reprocessing campaign, officially announcing to the world 
that it owned nuclear weapons in 2005.229  
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While there is enough reason to believe that both sides shared responsibility in 
contributing to the failure, these factors do not dismiss the fact that North Korea never 
intended to stop its nuclear progression. While Carter’s intervention resulted in an aversion 
of armed conflict and a pathway to the Agreed Framework in 1994, it also came with a 
double-edged sword. This move furthered emboldened North Korea because it recognized 
its nuclear weapons program became an advantage in obtaining concessions from the 
international community.230  
From North Korea’s perspective, however, taking this deal meant either 1) 
committing to denuclearization and risk being compromised by the United States, its 
historical enemy, or, 2) taking advantage of the material gains while continuing covert 
nuclear operations. North Korea chose the second option because there was too much risk 
involved for the regime to give up its nuclear weapons progression. As such, if the United 
States did not hold up its end of the deal, then it would only justify North Korea’s covert 
nuclear activities. Becoming nuclear weapons capable would guarantee North Korea’s 
security and provide deterrence sought against potential adversaries. Therefore, 
international actors could have made unlimited assurances of nonaggression; however, 
their assurances, especially considering past betrayals, did not hold the same security value 
that nuclear weapons ownership possessed. Because of this, North Korea perceived it still 
maintained the upper hand with regard to bargaining power. 
F. CHINA AND THE SECOND NUCLEAR CRISIS 
China’s willingness to play a greater role during the second nuclear crisis was 
shaped by two factors. First, China’s willingness to intervene stemmed from its experience 
of being dragged into a war once before, which showed it how its security could easily 
become severely threatened by a warmongering North Korea. The September 11th attacks 
added more fuel to the fire, and the United States and its allies focused more attention on 
the Pacific theater. The attacks ignited U.S. war efforts against nations perceived as 
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terrorist threats, and President Bush labeled North Korea as an axis of evil nation. During 
his 2002 State of the Union address in reference to North Korea, he proclaimed, “states 
like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace 
of the world.”231 North Korea lashed back out in retaliation, declaring the address as 
rhetoric meant to issue a threat of war upon it.232 For China, the Agreed Framework had 
helped it avoid potential catastrophe during the first nuclear crisis. However, with its 
collapse, China again was reliving the nightmare of possibly going to war in this second 
nuclear crisis because of a potential United States launch against its ally. Therefore, China 
had to act when the second nuclear crisis emerged because inaction would have led to an 
outbreak of war, which would have placed China back under a threat of U.S. influence.  
Second, China’s willingness to intervene reflected its deeper interests of gaining a 
larger economic and political role in the Pacific region, which also, shaped its foreign 
policy toward the Korean peninsula. On the one hand, China maintains to increase 
economic relations with South Korea to compete against the United States diplomatically. 
On the other hand, it maintains diplomatic and economic ties with North Korea to ensure 
its survival and prevent the spread of U.S. influence in the region.233 In turn, China had to 
prevent instability within North Korea because it cannot afford North Korea’s instability 
interfering with its own long-term strategic goals. Thus, China had to respond as a mediator 
for North Korea but also an enforcer upon North Korea.234  
China’s position at the outbreak of the second nuclear crisis had vastly improved 
as its approach to reform and integration placed them in a more powerful economic and 
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diplomatic position, thus, giving them the ability to play a greater role.235 On the other 
hand, North Korea experienced the following unforeseeable calamities, which accounted 
for its economic turmoil during the 1990s: 1) fall of the Soviet Union, 2) the 1995 and 1996 
floods, and 3) the 1997 drought.236 It had also become heavily dependent on China for 
economic backing in the process.237  
When North Korea’s nuclear violations were exposed for the second time, the 
international community stopped its aid and restarted sanctions against North Korea. This 
gave China the opportunity to now bandwagon with the international community in adding 
just enough economic pressure to coerce North Korea into negotiations without causing a 
total collapse.238 Thus, with economic turmoil occurring internally and economic pressure 
weighing down on it externally, North Korea had no more nuclear cards left for bargaining 
power and thus came to the negotiating table in 2003.239 The next challenge for the 
international community would come in keeping North Korea as an active participant 
during the Six Party Talks until a resolution could be achieved to solve the second nuclear 
crisis.  
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G. CONCLUSION: CHINA’S POLITICAL LEVERAGE VERSUS NORTH 
KOREA’S DEFIANCE 
This chapter has shown that China and North Korea’s competing interest widened 
the diplomatic divide between them and were significant in shaping China and North 
Korea’s behaviors during both the first and second nuclear crises. Thus, I argue that China 
and North Korea are not like “lips and teeth.” Rather, they are two states whose interests 
converge of some issues but diverge on others. Because of their divergent interests, I posit 
that China’s political leverage to force a denuclearized North Korea is severely 
overestimated. China’s demand for a nuclear free North Korea is seen by Pyongyang as 
call for North Korea to neglect its security, which further drives North Korea toward 
nuclear weapons and its goal of being recognized as a nuclear power by the outside world. 
My analysis of the two nuclear crises demonstrates that while China has sought to integrate 
with the international order and advance its international stature and economic ties, North 
Korea tended put its security concerns first. 
North Korea’s defiant behavior toward China regarding its nuclear weapons 
program has thus been shaped by two factors. The first factor for North Korea stems from 
its resentment of being treated as an outsider by its own communist brother China. North 
Korea’s interests in nuclear weapons went against the Soviet Union and China, and North 
Korea became more convinced that its communist brethren were downplaying its security 
concerns. The second factor for North Korea stems from China’s lack of defending it 
against the international community during the first nuclear crisis and China’s active 
bandwagoning with the international community against it during the second nuclear crisis. 
From North Korea’s perspective, therefore, China brought greater damage to its relations 
when it transgressed from supporting its denuclearization to actively demanding its 
denuclearization.  
China had already prematurely diminished its ability to influence politically North 
Korea before the first nuclear crisis even arose. China’s decision to become integrated with 
outsiders brought even greater limitations upon its influence over North Korea during the 
first nuclear crisis. By integrating with the international community, China rose in power 
and committed to altering its image from a “threatening” China to a “cooperative” China. 
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As China become more involved in the world economy, it become a much bigger economic 
player. 
North Korea’s economy, on the other hand, steeply declined with its transit into the 
1990s because of three factors: 1) Soviet Union’s collapse, 2) the floods, and 3) droughts—
all of which contributed to its vulnerability against the international community. As China 
became North Korea’s economic lifeline, it gained significant opportunity to play an active 
role toward it nuclear junior power ally during the second nuclear crisis. At this point, 
China could not risk damage to its international creditability as its was trying to portray the 
“good China” image to fulfill its own strategic objectives. North Korea went from a 
position of bargaining during the first nuclear crisis timeframe to a position of begging for 
assistance during the second nuclear crisis. However, North Korea’s commitment to 
ensuring its own security and maintaining its hold on power substantially outweighed 
China’s increased ability to have an active role over North Korea during the second nuclear 
crisis. Therefore, the international community must not assume that China alone can have 
influence on North Korea’s defiant behavior. I now turn to the next chapter, which assesses 





IV. NUKES, NEGOTIATIONS, AND THE PRICE OF 
BARGAINING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The North Korean nuclear threat continues to loom over the Pacific region, as the 
rogue nation continues to increase its nuclear weapons capabilities while issuing 
provocative threats against the international community. Currently, no actions by the 
international community have been sufficient to compel North Korea to abandon its nuclear 
pursuits. The last glimmer of hope to peacefully resolve the crisis came during the Six 
Party Talks as the participating nations, including North Korea, took a multilateral 
approach to resolve the crisis.240 In hosting the talks in Beijing, China chose to be the 
mediator between the participating nations so that a solution concerning North Korea’s 
nuclear program could be achieved.241 The talking rounds began in 2003, and throughout 
the talking rounds, the United States led the charge in calling for North Korea to conduct a 
“complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement”242 of its nuclear programs. These 
efforts lasted for the next six years until North Korea withdrew from the negotiating table 
in 2009. Currently, there is no resolution, and North Korea has 1) remained outside of the 
NPT, 2) neglected to return to the negotiating table, and 3) conducted multiple nuclear tests 
while issuing threats against the international community.  
Despite North Korea’s provocative behavior, China has thus far remained its sole 
greater power ally. The previous chapter showed that China and North Korea’s diplomatic 
ties are not as close as “lips and teeth”243 as some scholars may believe. Further building 
on this position, this chapter argues two points. The first is that China and North Korea 
remain diplomatically distant from one another instead of being closely tied, and second is 
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China and the United States overlooked that the value of reassurance to North Korea during 
the Six Party Talks period.244 This neglect was critical in North Korea’s decision to remain 
defiant. During the talks, China attempted to gain cooperation between the United States 
and North Korea. However, while publicly advocating for a multilateral resolution between 
the six nations, the United States pursued gaining a unilateral advantage against North 
Korea. North Korea perceived the United States’ continued hostility and forceful 
diplomacy as a threat, and in response, it abandoned the talks in 2009 to demonstrate its 
willingness to stand up to a stronger power. Thus, China alone could not sway North Korea 
away from its nuclear arsenal, and China’s potential for gaining influence to sway North 
Korea was further blocked by the United States’ hardline position during the Six Party 
Talks. Consequently, because China could not get the United States to cease its hostile 
behavior toward North Korea, diplomatic ties between China and North Korea became 
further distant, and China lost further leverage over North Korea’s behavior. 
B. CHINA AND NORTH KOREA’S INTERESTS IN THE SIX PARTY 
TALKS 
China foresaw a “strategic opportunity”245 in hosting the talks in Beijing and 
accepting the mediator role between the six nations since it wanted more integration with 
the international community.246 By choosing to host the Six Party Talks, China gained both 
internal and external respect for its diplomatic efforts in advocating for desired peace 
among nations.247 As previously discussed in the last chapter, China chose integration with 
the international community so that it could reclaim its status as a dominant power in the 
Pacific region. Thus, China believed that if it achieved a resolution to the second nuclear 
crisis through its mediation efforts, then it could gain a larger economic and political role 
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in the Pacific theater.248 China also wanted to prevent a regime collapse from occurring 
within North Korea.249 If China allowed a North Korea collapse, then outside actors (e.g., 
the United States) would gain the strategic advantage of being at its borders. Believing 
China could best persuade North Korea into dismantling since it was the North’s sole ally, 
the United States approaching China gave China another reason to host and mediate.250 
Like the United States, China also viewed multilateralism as the best avenue for resolving 
the international dispute.251 Moreover, China recognized that being a mediator did not 
mean it had to be the crisis problem solver, which meant China would be further alleviated 
of having sole responsibility over North Korea’s behavior. However, shared skepticism 
between the international community and North Korea challenged China’s ability to be an 
effective mediator 
North Korea believes it had the right to wield nuclear power for peaceful 
purposes.252 However, expressed objections from the international community (mainly the 
United States) gave North Korea a perception that the outside world downplayed its own 
legitimate security concerns. Evelyn Goh convincingly argues that security assurance must 
not be downplayed between nations; and, throughout the Six Party Talks, North Korea was 
pushing for a “package deal,” which contained security assurances, diplomatic relations, 
and economic assistance in exchange for dismantling its nuclear weapons program.253 
However, the international community claimed North Korea’s nuclear weapon pursuits 
made North Korea look more threatening to the outside world, destabilized the region, and 
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countered North Korea’s claim of “peaceful use.”254 These opinions caused the 
international community to have less regard for North Korea’s security concerns, which 
has also fueled North Korea’s resentment. 
Thus, China has sought benefits from being the host and mediator during the talks 
rested on two contingencies: 1) that the other nations would indeed soften their diplomatic 
approaches toward North Korea, and 2) that North Korea would gain confidence that the 
participating nations sincerely wanted to cooperate with it to peacefully resolve the crisis. 
China had to ensure the other four nations—Japan, South Korea, Russia, and the United 
States—would not be hostile when engaging North Korea. Additionally, China also had to 
get the other participating nations to readdress the issues within the Agreed Framework’s 
implementation since North Korea claimed the international community was not upholding 
its energy and resource assurances.255 
C. ROUND ONE: REFUSALS TO BUDGE 
As the other four nations came to the table in round one of the Six Party Talks to 
encourage cooperation, North Korea and the United States were each committed to 
competitive views. China opened the talking round by stressing: 1) achieving a 
denuclearized peninsula, 2) addressing North Korea’s security concerns, and 3) the need 
for a peaceful resolution of the crisis.256 While emphasizing North Korea’s immediate and 
irreversible dismantling of its nuclear weapons, Japan also supported addressing North 
Korea’s energy concerns and pursuing normalizing Japanese-North Korea relations.257 
Similarly, South Korea called for a peaceful comprehensive settlement of the nuclear 
problem, continued humanitarian aid to North Korea, and for the United States to reassure 
North Korea that it would not threaten North Korea’s security.258 Russia’s position 
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advocated resolution through negotiations and consideration for each participant’s interests 
within the region.259 Thus, the nations attempted to set the stage for conducive relations 
and cooperative dialogue. Their efforts to foster such an environment failed during the first 
round, however, because North Korea and the United States insisted on countering each 
other’s stated positions. North Korea called for the United States to discontinue its hostile 
approach toward it before anything else could take place. Similarly, the United States called 
on immediate disarmament and irreversible verification of its arsenal before anything else 
could take place, hence fundamentally stalling the talks.260  
This round then became nothing more than an opportunity for the United States and 
North Korea to demonstrate how strongly each supported its respective position, rather 
than reassuring each other. While North Korea demanded that the United States discontinue 
its hostile approach before negotiations, the United States, in a similar fashion, called on 
immediate disarmament and irreversible verification of North Korea’s arsenal before 
negotiations.261 North Korea believed it was essential to stand up to the United States and 
for the other participating nations to recognize North Korea and the United States as 
equals.262 On the other hand, the United States, believed North Korea could not be allowed 
to go down the nuclear path illegitimately without repercussions. Thus, the United States’ 
refused to conduct any bilateral talks with North Korea to pressure it into a multilateral 
approach.263  
Neither the United States nor North Korea could enter negotiations in which the 
other four participating nations were overtly in support of one side or the other. North 
Korea doubted the guarantees offered to it because of U.S. unwillingness to back away 
from its hardline position. At one point during this round, North Korea’s representative 
proclaimed, “The United States has not changed at all. We find it impossible to negotiate 
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with the United States.”264 North Korea perceived the United States’ unwillingness to back 
away from its hardlining proved security guarantees toward North Korea were, in fact, not 
guaranteed at all. This essentially defined the round as a “back and forth” between the two 
nations, while the other participants stood on the sidelines witnessing the two vocally lash 
out at each other.  
Therefore, China was unable to close the first round with a joint statement to the 
public on behalf of all the countries. Instead, the first round of talks ended on August 29, 
2003 with a summary of events that noted all countries pledged to “pursue peaceful and 
diplomatic solutions.”265 However, this summary really implied two points of emphasis: 1) 
no progress had been made, and 2) it became more uncertain if progress could be made. 
China recognized that the next round of talks would have the same outcome as the first 
round, unless both North Korea and the United States made some effort to back away from 
their extreme stances. The United States’ hard stance caused North Korea to be 
uninterested in future talks. Thus, to keep North Korea committed to the second round, 
China offered it food, oil, and assistance with construction projects in exchange for its 
participation.266 China’s willingness to accommodate North Korea gave it an incentive to 
participate in another round of negotiations. Thus, China maintained having influence over 
North Korea despite the United States’ hostility during this round.  
D. ROUND TWO: NORTH KOREA MAKES THE FIRST MOVE 
It was paramount for China to conduct the second round of talks sooner rather than 
later and to have a joint statement issued publicly at the end of the second round to show 
the world that the peaceful approaches on behalf of the participants were progressing 
toward resolving the crisis.267 Another summary simply would not hold the same value as 
a joint statement, which would represent solidarity among the participants. However, the 
second round of Six Party Talks can be summarized as China held North Korea with its 
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left hand and the United States with its right hand. While North Korea stuck its tongue out 
at the United States and reluctantly offered its hand, the United States, at the same time, 
stuck their tongue out back at North Korea while keeping its other hand behind its back. 
Essentially, both the United States and North Korea refused to find a resolution to the crisis.  
Without reason to let its suspicions go, the United States foresaw the second round 
as North Korean attempts to take advantage of the participating nations. The Bush 
administration believed the Clinton administration’s way of dealing bilaterally with North 
Korea had been a “failure.”268 This had led the Bush administration to also believe that 
North Korea saw bilateral talks as an opportunity to try and “blackmail”269 the United 
States again into providing it with food and economic aid in exchange for “good behavior.” 
Furthermore, the Bush administration charged that taking away the opportunity for bilateral 
negotiations would force North Korea to be “transparent”270 in a multilateral setting, and, 
thus, the United States insisted on maintaining a multilateral approach to resolving the 
nuclear issue. Additionally, Libya’s decision in 2003 to abandon its nuclear weapons 
program could aid U.S. efforts during the second round and gain support from the other 
participating nations to pressure North Korea into following Libya’s example.271  
Before the second round took place, North Korea still did not trust the United States 
and thus wanted to ensure that it would already have more ground over the United States 
during negotiations. To that end, it brought in U.S. nuclear experts to its facilities to: 1) 
allow the inspectors to witness its nuclear progressions and 2) communicate back to 
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Washington that North Korea was willing to freeze its nuclear programs.272 When the 
round began, North Korea made the first move by offering to progressively freeze its 
nuclear programs while it “simultaneously”273 would receive economic and food aid.274 
North Korea also insisted on only freezing its weapons programs, while still maintaining 
civilian use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes.275  
However, the United States refused to accept North Korea’s offer to freeze its 
nuclear program, charging that North Korea’s claim for peaceful use did not correspond 
with the end goal of a “Korean Peninsula without nuclear weapons.”276 A few months 
before the talks, President Bush had already stated publicly, “The goal of the United States 
is not for a freeze of the nuclear program…The goal is to dismantle a nuclear weapons 
program in a verifiable and irreversible way.”277 Bush wanted a plan that called on North 
Korea to first take “coordinated steps” in dismantling by verifiable means before any type 
of concessions would be given.278 Thus, the United States upheld its position that 
“complete, verifiable, irreversible, and dismantlement”279 would be the only way to gain 
any of its economic aid. 
Although China believed it was paramount to have a joint statement issued to show 
the world that there was solidarity among the participants and peaceful approaches were 
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progressing toward resolving the crisis,280 these prevailing factors prevented China from 
producing a joint statement on behalf of all the participating nations. Once again, China 
had to settle for a chair’s summary. The following statements within the summary are worth 
noting: “Through the talks, although differences remained, the Parties enhanced their 
understanding of each other’s positions … The Parties expressed their willingness to 
coexist peacefully. They agreed to take coordinated steps to address the nuclear issue and 
address the related concerns.”281 These statements demonstrate that ending the second 
nuclear crisis peacefully was the only issue agreed upon by the participating nations, and 
the parties could not come to consensus about anything else during the second round of 
talks.  
Because the first and second rounds of talks were anything but progressive, two 
points stand out: 1) the United States and North Korea had to be swayed from their 
absolutes if actual negotiations were to take place in the third round, and 2) China would 
have to maintain its mediating role between its ally (North Korea) and its primary 
competitor (United States) if a realistic resolution could be achieved. As such, China called 
on the United States to have more “flexibility” toward North Korea;282 China hoped for a 
position that would facilitate more cooperation from North Korea. However, even though 
both countries offered something, the United States still insisted that North Korea give up 
its nuclear weapons first, and neither country acted to reassure the other. The outcome of 
this round placed a further strain on China’s leverage over North Korea as North Korea 
began to perceive that the United States was refusing to abandon its hostile diplomacy 
during negotiations. 
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E. ROUND THREE: GETTING NOWHERE FAST 
The third round of talks began with the United States introducing its own proposal 
of how North Korea should dismantle its nuclear programs.283 Within this proposal, the 
United States called for North Korea to take the following steps. First, North Korea would 
provide sign pledging its commitment to denuclearize.284 In return for North Korea’s 
commitment, the other participating nations (not including the United States) would 
proceed in providing fuel assistance.285 Next, North Korea would be given a three-month 
window to begin dismantling its uranium and plutonium nuclear facilities.286 Finally, after 
outside inspectors verified the process as in progress, “interim provisions”287 regarding 
“multilateral security assurances,”288 “long-term energy assistance,”289 and the “lifting of 
economic sanctions”290 would then be “considered.”291 
North Korea refuted the U.S. proposal, however, and instead proposing that in 
exchange for freezing its nuclear weapons programs, it would receive oil and energy aid 
from the participating nations, with contributions from United States.292 North Korea also 
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wanted to be removed from the United States list as a “sponsor of terrorism”293 and 
demanded that sanctions against them be lifted.294 Additionally, North Korea wanted its 
nuclear weapons freeze to be verified through a “six-party multilateral framework”295 
instead of through IAEA inspection;296 and, North Korea wanted to retain their right to use 
nuclear power for peaceful purposes.297 Although North Korea communicated that the 
United States had offered it a “constructive proposal,”298 it perceived the United States’ 
rejection of its “reward for freeze”299 and continued pursuit of “complete verifiable 
irreversible denuclearization”300 as “hostile policy.”301 As a result, North Korea came to 
see the United States’ proposal as a “sham.”302 Because the United States disregarded 
China’s urge to remain flexible, North Korea saw this round as further example of the 
international community disregarding its security. Thus, at the end of round three, China 
again would have to settle for the chairman’s statement, indicating, “There is still a 
[existing] lack of mutual trust among the parties.”303 
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F. CONTINUED CLASHES AND FAILED DIPLOMACY 
After the third round, continued antagonism between the United States and North 
Korea largely obstructed China’s diplomatic efforts. After securing victory in the second 
election, President Bush made his feelings clear during his inaugural address when he 
declared,  
The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the 
world … It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth 
of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with 
the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.304  
Shortly after this, Condoleezza Rice, newly appointed as secretary of state, included North 
Korea within her “outpost of tyranny”305 list. Furthermore, President Bush reiterated his 
declaration during the 2005 State of the Union address that America had “the ultimate goal 
of ending tyranny in our world.”306  
These statements sent two clear messages to North Korea. The first was that the 
United States truly recognized North Korea as an enemy state. This classification made 
North Korea’s call for a nonaggression treaty307 implausible, and, more importantly, 
reinforced its notion that peace between the two nations could not be achieved. The second 
message received by North Korea was that the United States wanted to transform it into a 
democracy. North Korea perceived that because it was not democratic like the United 
States, it could not be trusted until it changed its way of life and adopted American 
principles. From North Korea’s perspective, the United States sought to generate 
opposition among other democratic-leaning nations against North Korea, and President 
Bush’s making North Korea part of the “tyrant” club was an effective way of ensuring this 
opposition. However, North Korea believed these verbal attacks were a matter of defense 
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and, to bolster its defense, it must declare to the world that it was a nuclear weapons 
power.308  
China grew increasingly fearful that tensions between the United States and North 
Korea were rising to an uncontrollable level; the glimmers of hope for achieving a 
resolution to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program were growing increasingly dim. 
China and the other participating nations attempted to keep the talks alive and to gain 
cooperation between the United States and North Korea so that both could move toward 
common ground. Although it was extremely angered by North Korea, China objected to 
any suggestions that it cease aiding North Korea, and it still urged the nations to keep 
negotiating.309 Despite North Korea’s declaration of nuclear weapons ownership, Japan 
still wanted to keep negotiations open, to gain normalized relations with North Korea, and 
to commit to provide economic and energy aid.310 Similarly, South Korea called for the 
United States to stop its hostile approaches toward the North.311 Additionally, it offered to 
develop industries in the North and is committed to energy and food aid to the North.312 
Russia still defended North Korea’s call for peaceful nuclear power if it returned to the 
NPT and committed IAEA standards.313  
The United States’ rejection of North Korea’s call for peaceful nuclear use and its 
charge that North Korea was using counterfeit dollars to fund terrorist groups again blocked 
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these ongoing efforts at the negotiating table.314 North Korean Banco Delta Asia accounts 
were frozen, and North Korea feared the United States was attempting to “stop the heart”315 
of its nation by means of unilateral economic strangulation. Thus, despite the urgings by 
China and the other nations to cooperate and despite warnings of international sanctions, 
North Korea chose to test a nuclear weapon in 2006316 and to withdraw from the Six Party 
Talks later in 2009.317 In the end, divergence prevailed over convergence during the Six 
Party Talks, China’s ability to mediate effectively became even more diplomatically 
limited, and North Korea went further down the path of committing to its nuclear power, 
rather than risking its vulnerability through negotiations.  
G. CONCLUSION: THE PRICE OF BARGAINING IS REASSURANCE 
This chapter first shows that the value of reassurance is a key factor underlying any 
multilateral effort between nations. The first is that while both the United States and North 
Korea expect each other’s side to accept its bargaining propositions, neither side was 
willing to concede in giving a major ground toward the opposition’s bargaining proposal. 
For the United States, the driving factor in its hostile policy toward North Korea during the 
Six Party Talks was its own lack of confidence that North Korea would not attempt another 
blackmail. The costs of miscalculation were too high, and thus, the United States would 
not accept any other option except for complete dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear 
program. For North Korea, the United States’ continued hostility combined with its 
avoidance of committing to guaranteeing North Korea’s security and energy needs caused 
its lowered reassurance. Second, because of the perception of both United States and North 
Korea that there would be more political loss than political gain in agreeing with the other, 
multilateralism failed because neither the United States nor North Korea would believe that 
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the opposite party would stick by its commitments. Both sides did show a willingness to 
modify propositions to show favor toward one another. However, both sides would only 
retreat temporarily from hardlining, to return to their original hard-lining position. This 
distrust severely damaged the value of reassurance, which crippled the ability to bargain, 
and thus subsided any positive force generated by joint efforts to achieve a multilateral 
resolution. 
This chapter also reveals that China’s inability to reassure North Korea resulted in 
it having limited influence over North Korea during the Six Party talks. Furthermore, this 
explains why North Korea chose to remain defiant against the international community’s 
demand for their denuclearization. North Korea perceived that China did not have the 
influence to alter the United States behavior toward it, and thus, North Korea became 
convinced that China would not be able to protect it from the United States. Over the course 
of dialogue, North Korea perceived the United States was using the multilateral framework 
as a means of forming a unilateral front against it. This perception of a hostile United States 
drove North Korea to cling tighter to their nuclear weapons program and withdraw from 
the Six Party Talks. Hence, while China was angry that North Korea chose to stick defiantly 
to its nuclear obsessions, it was still compelled to protect North Korea from severe 
punishment by outside actors. Both the United States’ inflexibility and North Korea’s 
growing security paranoia, China’s efforts to keep the multilateral approach afloat. Thus, 
both issues caused China to lose leverage over North Korea and severely impeded its ability 
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V. UNDERSTANDING THE CHINA AND NORTH KOREA 
LEVERAGE DILEMMA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A greater power nation may possess more leverage than its smaller power nation 
ally. However, the greater power ally may not automatically retain more leverage over its 
smaller power ally simply because it is the greater power. In fact, the smaller power ally 
could have more leverage over its greater power ally simply because sustaining the alliance 
is just as important to the greater power ally as it is to the smaller power ally. While it may 
seem that China would have more power over North Korea, China’s belief that North 
Korea’s survivability is crucial to its own self-interests allows North Korea to be defiant 
against China when it desires.  
From the beginning, this thesis has sought to answer if China alone possesses 
enough leverage to have major influence over North Korea’s behavior. My initial 
assumption was that China, as the greater power ally, did have enough leverage to coerce 
North Korea into meeting its demands as desired. However, analysis in the second, third, 
and fourth chapters within this thesis reveal that this is not the case. The first chapter finds 
that the China and North Korean alliance is based more upon self-interests, rather than 
being an asymmetrical alliance that give China more power over North Korea. The second 
chapter indicates that North Korea chose to pursue developing nuclear weapons despite 
opposition from China. Additionally, North Korea had become a nuclear weapons capable 
nation without the help of China; therefore, China’s ability to have leverage over it was 
further limited. The third chapter indicates that China was unable to convince North Korea 
to give up its nuclear weapons because China failed to reassure North Korea it could 
safeguard North Korea’s security from the United States’ hostility. Let me now flesh out 
each of these three main points in more detail. 
1. The China and North Korea Alliance Arises 
The first chapter shows that China and North Korea did not have deep motivations 
to form political and cultural ties and that their relationship was largely driven by the Soviet 
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Union’s desire to have a strong Communist stronghold. Although Kim Il Sung was 
determined to take over South Korea to reunify the peninsula, he was effectively powerless 
to complete this objective without Soviet backing. Similarly, Mao needed Soviet support 
to eventually reclaim Taiwan, but he was compelled to demonstrate loyalty to the 
Communist stronghold. Thus, Mao put his own plans on hold to support Kim’s plan to take 
over South Korea since Stalin gave Kim approval. As we know, however, the Korea War 
ended with an armistice and left both China and North Korea as subordinate allies to the 
greater power Soviet Union. With the Korean War over, it now was time to make Taiwan 
a priority for both the Soviet Union and North Korea to support.  
Revisionist Khrushchev, who was now the ringleader over the Soviet Union, 
blocked Mao’s plan to recapture Taiwan. Khrushchev foresaw a world in which capitalism 
and communism could coexist, which effectively downplayed the threat of the United 
States. To China and North Korea, Khrushchev’s coexistence beliefs and his public 
criticisms of the Soviet Union’s previous leader (Stalin), made Khrushchev look like a 
traitor to communist principles. Thus, Mao believed he ought to be the leader of the 
Communist regime and continue to spread the revolution throughout the Pacific theater 
and then eventually throughout the world. As for North Korea, while Kim Il Sung 
distrusted both the Soviet Union and China, Khrushchev’s criticism of his leadership over 
North Korea pushed Kim closer to Mao. On the other hand, Kim recognized there was 
opportunity for material and economic gains for North Korea if he successfully 
manipulated both his greater power allies against one another. Thus, China and North 
Korea came together as allies for two reasons: 1) their own self-interests, and 2) their shared 
threat perceptions of the United States and the Soviet Union.  
2. North Korea’s Nuclear Achievement and China’s Worst Fear 
The second chapter demonstrates that China alone was unable to force North Korea 
to abandon its nuclear ambitions during the outbreaks of the first and second nuclear crisis 
in 1993 and in 2003, respectively. Throughout the Cold War, China refused to help North 
Korea in developing nuclear weapons, perhaps believing that withholding aid to North 
Korea would deter it from acting unilaterally to develop nuclear weapons on its own. 
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Following the Korean War, the United States and North Korea persisted in provoking each 
other. At one point, the United States even positioned nuclear weapons in South Korea to 
counter any potential attack by the North. From the beginning of his reign, Kim Il Sung 
refused allow North Korea be the “shrimp among whales”318—the non-nuclear weapons 
nation regionally surrounded by China, the Soviet Union, and the United States defending 
South Korea, which all were nuclear weapons capable nations. Thus, as China and the 
Soviet Union continued to compete for more influence over North Korea, Kim Il Sung saw 
their competition as an opportunity to continue his manipulation of both greater power 
allies so that nuclear weapons aid could be gained from both. However, as both China and 
the Soviet Union refused to budge with regard to giving North Korea nuclear weapons 
assistance, Kim Il Sung determined that developing nuclear weapons was an objective that 
had to be accomplished by his own hand and thus developing nuclear weapons became the 
strategic objective that North Korea itself needed to accomplish.  
After the Soviet Union collapsed, North Korea perceived China’s decision to 
pursue integration with the international community as a betrayal of the remaining 
communist stronghold, and this perception ultimately drove a further wedge between China 
and North Korean relations. China previously had refused to help North Korea with its 
nuclear weapons, and now, North Korea perceived that China again was turning its backs 
on North Korea so as to appease the outside world. On the one hand, China sought 
cooperation with the international community so that it could rise again as a dominant 
power in Asia. However, China’s decision to pursue integration also caused it to be a part 
of any rising conflicts between the international community and North Korea, its smaller 
power ally. On the other hand, China already knew its own diplomatic influence over North 
Korea’s provocative behavior was limited. Furthermore, China especially knew it alone 
could neither force nor convince North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons pursuits. Thus, 
China’s worst fear had come to reality when the United States exposed North Korea’s 
covert nuclear pursuits, and the world realized that North Korea had become an illegitimate 
nuclear power in the face of greater powers.  
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In 1993, China was placed in an even greater bind as it faced the dilemma of 
preventing total war between the United States, which was pressing to launch an attack on 
known North Korea nuclear sites and North Korea, which was refusing to give up the 
nuclear deterrent it had finally achieved. Fortunately, the United States and North Korea 
found a way of peacefully resolving their disputes by establishing the Agreed Framework, 
which was intended to provide economic and energy assistance to North Korea in exchange 
for abandoning its nuclear weapons abandonment. However, this resolution did not last. 
North Korea perceived that the international community was not fulfilling its end of the 
agreement because of its continuous delays in providing fuel aid and its delays in 
commencing construction of North Korea’s civil nuclear reactors. Thus, continuing to 
mistrust the outside world, North Korea chose to stick to covertly furthering its nuclear 
weapons programs. However, the United States again exposed North Korea’s covert 
nuclear weapons pursuits, and when the United States withdrew from the Agreed 
Framework, North Korea then withdrew from the NPT, creating the second nuclear crisis 
arose in 2003. Faced with another possible outbreak of war, China chose to have an active 
role in the second nuclear crisis because it could not afford an unstable North Korea 
interfering with its own strategic objectives. China had reaped enough economic benefits 
from its previous decision to integrate with the international community, while North 
Korea had suffered economically from 1) the Soviet Union’s collapse, 2) the 1995 and 
1996 floods, and 3) the 1997 drought. Since North Korea had also become heavily 
dependent on China for economic support, China gained enough leverage to force North 
Korea to participate in negotiations during the Six Party Talks so that the second nuclear 
crisis could be resolved. 
3. Multinational Efforts and North Korea’s Defiance 
The third chapter also shows that China was unable to influence North Korea to 
remain a participant in the Six Party Talks. Although China, Japan, North Korea, South 
Korea, Russia, and the United States pursued this multinational effort, it was unsuccessful 
in ending the second nuclear crisis. First, China’s inability to reassure North Korea that its 
security interests was safeguarded made China unable to influence North Korea’s decision 
to abandon the Six Party Talks. China recognized that it was the one in the best position to 
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mediate between the nations so that it could collectively find a resolution to the second 
nuclear crisis before the Six Party Talks took place. However, once the talking rounds 
began to unfold, it became apparent to North Korea that the United States would not 
abandon its hostility toward North Korea, and it also became apparent that China did not 
have enough leverage to coerce the United States into altering its behavior. Thus, North 
Korea chose to be safe rather than sorry in withdrawing from the negotiating table, and 
China could not do anything about it.  
Second, the United States’ neglect to reassure North Korea caused China to also 
have limited influence over North Korea’s decision to abandon the Six Party Talks. During 
the first round, both the United States and North Korea only wanted to demonstrate their 
toughness against one another by not budging on their stances on complete and irreversible 
dismantlement. In the second round, North Korea brought forth a proposal demonstrating 
its willingness to freeze its nuclear weapons programs as long as it would be allowed 
peaceful civil nuclear use. However, the United States remained hardlined in its original 
stance. In the third round, the United States introduced a proposal to gain cooperation from 
North Korea. However, this proposal similarly demanded complete and irreversible 
dismantlement before the United States would provide North Korea any economic or 
security guarantees. As such, North Korea perceived that the United States continued to 
live up to its title as its “arch-enemy.”  
North Korea also perceived that the United States labeling it as a “tyrant” and 
“sponsor of terrorism” made clear that the two nations were de facto enemies of one 
another. It is hard to deny that North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons presented a major 
problem to the United States’ foreign policy after the September 11 attacks. If the United 
States allowed North to illegitimately be recognized as a nuclear power among nations 
after labeling it tyrants and sponsors of terrorism, then the United States advocacy for a 
“Global War on Terror”319 would potentially face severe criticism domestically and 
internationally; thus, the United States could not back away from this premise. On the other 
hand, North Korea could not help but perceive that the United States wanted to bring it 
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down in defeat. Additionally, it could not afford miscalculation, to give up its nuclear 
weapons, and risk the United States toppling the North Korean government. Moreover, 
North Korea foresaw that the United States was using the multinational framework to foster 
competition, instead of using the multinational framework to foster cooperation, and thus, 
it contributed to North Korea remaining a defiant nation against China and against the 
international community. I now turn to discussing the significance of the China and North 
Korea leverage dilemma as it affects the international relations between the two countries 
and other nations. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CHINA AND NORTH KOREA LEVERAGE 
DILEMMA 
While an alliance endures between China and North Korea today, it is significant 
to inquire whether the United States’ pursuit of unilateral action against North Korea is the 
best means of ensuring long-term stability in the Pacific region. I believe that if armed 
conflict is to be avoided between the United States and China, then the United States should 
avoid acting unilaterally because as the first and second nuclear crises have proven, it has 
done more harm than good to the international community. The first nuclear crisis proved 
the United States is capable of having bilateral negotiations with North Korea. The second 
nuclear crisis proved the United States’ pursuit of unilateralism backfired in its aim of 
denuclearizing North Korea. Furthermore, as Graham Allison argues, the United States and 
China should make every effort to work closely to avoid the “Thucydides trap,”320 rather 
than to allow itself to become “Destined for War.”321 As such, in my view, the North Korea 
threat is the trap that must be avoided by both the United States and China. The old way of 
pursuing the “containment”322 of nations becomes an increasing challenge in a growing 
multipolar threat environment, and like John Quincy Adams once famously proclaimed, 
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the United States “goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy.”323 The United States 
may not need to be always solely responsible for the multipolar threat environment, 
especially when one considers other nations that are more than willing and are also able to 
fulfill this area of responsibility. As Robert Kagan claimed, “The United States has 
certainly not shaped the international environment by itself” … “It is nations, made up of 
people, that shape the world, not gods or angels.”324 Robert McNamara, former United 
States Secretary of Defense, offered a very important lesson when he said to “empathize 
with your enemy.”325 Thus, an argument can be made that if the United States wants to 
gain any ability of shaping North Korea behavior by any measure, it must first recognize 
that it needs help from other nations, primarily China, to have impact on North Korea’s 
defiance. Secondly, the United States must not expect that it can influence North Korea’s 
behavior by its own hand if China, North Korea’s sole ally, is unable to shape North 
Korea’s behavior on its own. Therefore, the United States should work to have a 
cooperative diplomatic relationship with China to gain more leverage as an outside actor 
of the China and North Korean alliance. 
Based on the historical lessons of the Six Party Talks, one could argue that if North 
Korea would concede in giving up its nuclear weapons, then the United States would 
recede, and long-term stability could finally be achieved. However, it is also equally 
important to recognize that if the United States continues to pose a threat to North Korea, 
it will in turn continue to further cling to its nuclear ambitions, and the Six Party Talks 
reflect this logic. Additionally, if nations are calling for the United States to have a less 
hostile approach toward the smaller power, then the United States should at least consider 
this suggestion.  
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Today, in 2017, unless the United States and North Korea can both resolve the 
reassurance dilemmas they have with regard to one another, the ability for either side to 
bargain and negotiate with the other will not work. Additionally, no matter how many 
participating nations are involved to bring resolution to the North Korea nuclear problem, 
multilateralism between nations will not work unless the participating nations work 
together in cooperation to the reassurance dilemmas between the United States and North 
Korea. The United States and North Korea are left with two possible conclusions. Either 
more competition will breed between these two rivals, or reassurance will eventually foster 
cooperation between them. The United States and North Korea will ultimately have to 
make a decision, and, hopefully, the latter option is chosen by the United States and North 
Korea because the rest of the world depends on a peaceful resolution, rather than a 
resolution by armed conflict. Multilateralism is still an option available today for the 
United States; however, the United States also needs to understand how multilateralism 
efforts weakened during the previous Six Party Talks so that future efforts will not face the 
same challenges. The question remains as to whether political leaders in the United States 
will take heed of this lesson instead of fighting fire with fire. Additionally, the international 
community should also reconsider the driving factors that contributed to North Korea 
abandoning dialogue and committing to defiance since new insights may help determine 
the best course of action in gaining cooperation from North Korea. 
C. CONCLUSION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE CHINA AND NORTH 
KOREA LEVERAGE DILEMMA 
1. If establishing the conditions for long-term stability in Asia is a true goal of 
the United States, it must consider the following policy recommendations, 
which move toward cooperation with China to further deal with North 
Korea: 
2. Unless war has been declared, avoid taking unilateral actions. 
3. Since they are the North’s sole ally, allow China to have more of a leading 
role in dealing with North Korea. 
4. Instead of advocating for North Korea’s isolation, make efforts to foster 
multilateral cooperation between the international community and North 
Korea. 
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While, today North Korea’s nuclear weapons ambitions and the leverage dilemma within 
the China and North Korean alliance have further complicated the United States’ ability to 
ensure long-term stability in the Pacific theater, the problem is solvable. As MacMillan 
claims, “There will be no peace for Asia or for the world unless those two great Pacific 
powers, the United States and China, the one supreme today and the other perhaps 
tomorrow, find ways to work with each other.”326 If we think back historically to President 
Nixon’s visit to China, he made it “a week that changed the world”327 because he 
understood that “good relations between [the United States and China] … [would bring] 
stability and peace to Asia and, indeed, to the world.”328 Similarly, the Cuban Missile Crisis 
was a historic moment by which the United States and the Soviet Union came inches away 
from nuclear war, and fortunately, both nations avoided nuclear catastrophe both 
understood the need to cooperate with one another. Equally, Michael Dobbs convincingly 
argues the two nations nuclear war because “two men, one in Washington, one in Moscow, 
[struggled] with the specter of nuclear destruction they themselves [had] unleashed.”329 
Fred Charles Iklé once stated, “History is a cruel tutor. It hammers a lesson into our minds 
so sternly that no one dares to mention the many exceptions that must be allowed. Yet as 
soon as we have learned that lesson—and ignored its exceptions—history punishes us for 
not following another rule that posits the very opposite.”330 From this notion, I believe that 
history has taught us that cooperation is possible even in the most challenging 
environments in which international relations take place, and we need to heed history’s 
teachings before we again are punished for not following another rule posited. 
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